… Gleichstellung der Geschlechter und Rolle der Frauen bei der Friedenssicherung – Bruchlandung von Jemens Wirtschaft – Saudische Entscheidung bedroht Millionen von Jemeniten mit Armut – Die Suche nach Gesundheitsversorgung in Taiz – Update zum Bürgerkrieg im Jemen und den Kämpfen in Marib – Wie der Iran den Huthis half, ihre Reichweite zu vergrößern – Sokotra-Archipel vom Krieg bedroht – und mehr
Aug. 31, 2021: Houthi strike on Yemen military base kills 40 soldiers – Fenced Hearts: Enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention – Gender equality and women’s role in peacebuilding – Yemen’s economy in crash landing mode – Saudi decision threatens to plunge millions more Yemenis into poverty – Seeking healthcare in Taiz – Update on the civil war in Yemen and the fighting in Marib – How Iran helped Houthis to expand their reach – The Socotra Archipelago threatened by the civil war – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-757b-yemen-war-mosaic-757b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
(* B H)
ECHO Factsheet – Yemen (Last updated 19/08/2021)
After more than 6 years of conflict, Yemen remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Millions of Yemenis were displaced, destitute and hungry even before COVID-19 hit and the flow of remittances to the country drastically shrank.
Aid agencies warn that the window to prevent famine in 2021 is closing. To avert a worst-case scenario, there is a need to increase aid, grant humanitarian access and address the political and economic drivers of the crisis. The EU remains committed to maintaining its humanitarian support during the Yemen crisis.
(* B K P)
Update on the civil war in Yemen and the fighting in Marib (1/2). From 2015 to 2021, Yemen plunged into an unstoppable civil war
A civil war with multiple actors
Since the start of the civil war in Yemen in 2015, the political equation has been complex and the play of the players is more plural than dual.
A civil war that still divides the country and deepens the political impasse
It is therefore difficult to imagine the exit doors of this crisis. The weakening of the Saudi coalition since the withdrawal of Qatari and Emirati troops and the considerable reduction of Sudanese forces as well as of the Yemeni national army, encouraged Saudi Arabia to initiate discussions with the Houthi rebels as soon as the end of the war. ‚year 2019. The failure of the Stockholm agreement signed in December 2018 in order to limit the fighting in Hodeidah [ 5 ] , the main port of the country participating in the food supply of 18 million Yemenis in the north and allowing the transport of 80% of international humanitarian aid, testify to the complexity of finding common ground between the parties to this war [6 ] . While the United States and the UN are trying to end this conflict, their attempts so far have not been successful.
Indeed, since 2019, a United Nations group of experts on Yemen reports that the country is the victim of a „generalized lack of responsibility“ [ 12 ] and the Human Rights Watch association regrets the absence of international justice and ambivalence of Western states, „The coalition carried out air strikes that violated the laws of war by attacking civilians and civilian structures, using ammunition purchased from the United States, France, and other countries ”
Over the years of war, Yemen has become an increasingly divided country, making political resolutions complicated if not impossible. Political alternatives do not emerge, the impasse becomes deeper and the people suffer the direct consequences.
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** A K)
Mehr als 30 Tote bei Raketenangriff auf Luftwaffenstützpunkt
Bei einem Raketen- und Drohnenangriff auf einen Militärstützpunkt im Süden Jemens sind nach Angaben eines Militärsprechers am Sonntag mindestens 30 Soldaten getötet worden. Außerdem seien mindestens 65 weitere verletzt worden, sagte Mohamed al-Nakib, Sprecher der Streitkräfte im Süden des Landes. Zuvor hatten Vertreter von Militär und Gesundheitspersonal von mindestens drei Explosionen auf dem Stützpunkt Al-Anad in der Provinz Lahdsch berichtet. Sie machten Huthi-Rebellen für den Angriff verantwortlich. Der Stützpunkt wird von der international anerkannten Regierung gehalten.
Demnach sei eine ballistische Rakete auf dem Übungsgelände des Stützpunkts eingeschlagen, als sich dort am Morgen Dutzende Soldaten aufhielten. Sanitäter sprachen von chaotischen Szenen nach den Explosionen. Ein Militärsprecher der Huthi wollte den Angriff weder bestätigen noch dementieren. D
(A K pH)
Zahlreiche saudische Söldner bei jemenitischen Angriffen auf Stützpunkt getötet und verletzt
Zahlreiche von Saudi-Arabien unterstützte Milizen, die dem ehemaligen Präsidenten des Jemen, Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, treu ergeben sind, sind ums Leben gekommen, als jemenitische Armeesoldaten und Kämpfer verbündeter Volkskomitees ihre Position in Lahij, der südlichen Provinz des Landes, angriffen.
Dozens of soldiers killed after Houthis strike Yemen military base
At least 30 soldiers were killed and 60 wounded on Sunday in Houthi strikes on a military base belonging to forces of the Saudi-led coalition in southwest Yemen, a spokesman for the southern forces and medical sources said.
Naqeeb said that between 30 to 40 soldiers were killed and at least 60 wounded, adding the death toll may still rise as rescuers were still clearing the scene.
The southern forces are part of the Saudi-led coalition.
Two medical sources said several bodies had arrived at Lahj province’s main hospital along with another 16 wounded people. It was unclear if civilians were among the casualties.
Residents said that several loud blasts were heard in the al-Anad area, which is located at some 70 km (43 miles) north of the southern port city of Aden.
Several other residents from the disputed central city of Taiz said they heard ballistic missiles fired from launchers positioned in the Houthi-held eastern suburbs of the city.
https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-int/at-least-30-killed-in-houthi-strikes-on-yemen-base-spokesman-says-idUSKBN2FU066 = https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210829-dozens-of-soldiers-killed-after-houthis-strike-yemen-military-base = https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-08-29/at-least-two-killed-in-houthi-strikes-on-yemen-base-say-medical-sources
(** A K)
30 loyalists killed in strikes on Yemen’s biggest airbase
„More than 30 have been killed and at least 56 were injured“ in the strikes on the airbase in the government-held southern province of Lahij, armed forces spokesman Mohammed al-Naqib told AFP.
Video footage from the scene showed dozens of people gathered in front of Lahij hospital, where one ambulance after another was pulling up to drop off casualties.
An official from the hospital said it was all hands on deck.
„We have called on the entire staff, surgeons and nurses, to come in,“ Mohsen Murshid told AFP.
„We also know that there are still bodies under the rubble“.
Naqib had in an earlier statement accused Yemen’s Shiite Huthi rebels of carrying out missile and drone strikes on the facility.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-9937239/7-loyalists-killed-strikes-Yemens-largest-airbase.html = https://news.yahoo.com/30-loyalists-killed-strikes-yemens-074606742.html = https://www.barrons.com/news/30-loyalists-killed-in-strikes-on-yemen-airbase-new-toll-01630232408?refsec=afp-news
(** A K pS)
Yemen: At least 40 killed in Houthi strikes on military base
At least 40 pro-government soldiers from the Al Amalikah Brigades were killed and 70 injured in a Houthi rebel missile attack on a military base in southern Yemen on Sunday, military officials said.
„The death toll rose to between 30 to 40 soldiers and more than 60 were injured in the attack,“ Lt Col Mohammed Al Naqib, spokesman of the fourth military district in the pro-government southern forces, told The National. The attack targeted Al Anad military base in southern Lahj province.
Most of the injured are in a critical situation which may increase the death toll in the coming few hours, the military spokesperson said. One of the missiles directly hit a hangar where tens of soldiers were resting while another targeted another group during training.
„Four ballistic missiles hit while a squad from the third battalion in the Al Amalikah forces was carrying out military training around 9.10am,“ said Gen Ali Al Awlaki, director of the pro-government Military Operations Room in Aden.
Al Anad, the largest military base in Yemen, is 60 kilometres north of Aden.
The base is controlled by the Yemeni government and hosts troops from the Saudi-led Coalition fighting alongside the Yemeni government against the rebels.
It was not immediately known if any soldiers from the coalition were killed or injured in the attack.
„The missiles were fired from areas under the Houthi control in Taez province and preceded by drones that hovered over the base minutes before the attack,“ Gen Al Awlaki said.
Lt Col Al Naqib said the drones spotted the soldiers during their training and the missiles were launched later.
(** A K)
Official: Missile, drone attack on Yemeni air base kills 30
Mohammed al-Naqib, spokesman for Yemen’s southern forces, told The Associated Press the attack on Al-Anad Air Base in the province of Lahj wounded at least 65. He said the casualty toll could rise since rescue teams were still clearing the site.
Graphic footage from the scene showed several charred bodies on the ground with ambulance sirens blaring in the background.
Yemeni officials said at least three explosions took place at the air base, which is held by the internationally recognized government. No one immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.
A ballistic missile landed in the base’s training area, where dozens of troops were doing morning exercises, the officials said. Medics described a chaotic scene following the explosions, with soldiers carrying their wounded colleagues to safety, fearing another attack.
Solider Nasser Saeed survived that attack. He was taken along with other wounded to the Naqib hospital in Aden. He said a barracks that housed over 50 troops had been hit by missiles, then explosives-laden drones.
“We were able to shoot down one (drone),” he said. “Many were killed and wounded.”
Most of the wounded were taken to the nearby Ibn Khaldun hospital, where health officials said many of the wounded were in critical condition and suffer third degree burns.
while the Houthis themselves deny this attack:
(* A K pH)
UAE-backed mercenary camp attacked by unknown assailants
Unknown gunmen have launched an attack on Sunday, targeting a military parade of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militias in al-Anad military base, the coalition’s largest military base in Lahj, southern Yemen.
Activists on social media circulated pictures of dozens of dead and wounded being taken to hospitals outside the base.
There are conflicting reports about whether the attack was carried out by drones or by rocket shelling.
The attack came at a time when the province, located near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is experiencing tension between several parties within the Hadi puppet government.
Saudi Arabia strongly condemns Houthi attack on Al-Anad base in Yemen
UAE condemns Houthi’s strike of Al Anad Air Base in Yemeni Lahij Governorate
Yemen’s president says Houthis ‘will pay the price’ for attack on al-Anad airbase
Yemen’s Information Minister: Al-Anad Attack Confirms Houthis Target all Yemenis without Discrimination
UK Condemns the Deadly Attack on al-Anad Airbase
British Ambassador to Yemen Richard Oppenheim wrote on Twitter that he was “shocked about the outrageous attack on Yemen’s Al-Anad airbase,” offering his sincere condolences for the families of the dead and injured.
(A H K)
MSF: Our medical teams at the @MSF trauma hospital in #Aden received 11 wounded people following the attacks on Al-Anad Air Base in #Lahj Governorate. They were provided with the necessary medical and surgical assistance and they were discharged from the hospital. (photos)
(** B P)
Film: Fenced Hearts
„Fenced Hearts“ a new documentary produced by Mwatana for Human Rights on enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention incidents committed by the warring parties in #Yemen.
(** B P)
Strategizing Beyond the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda in Yemen: The Importance of CEDAW
Seven years into the war in Yemen, there is considerable and growing resistance within the internationally recognized Yemeni government, Houthi authorities, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), local authorities and armed groups toward the promotion of gender equality and women’s role in peacebuilding. At the invitation of the UN special envoy for Yemen, women were present in peace negotiations in Kuwait (2016), Geneva (2018) and Stockholm (2018), but their participation was not accepted by the delegations. The text of the Stockholm Agreement was assessed to be “genderblind”, and ignoring women’s rights. There are no women in the current cabinet of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.
During Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013-14, Yemeni women negotiated a 30 percent quota in elected bodies and governmental institutions. With reference to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, women expected support from the international community, especially the United Nations, for their demands to be included in mediation and peacebuilding efforts. The WPS agenda focuses on two themes: the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a war strategy; and women’s participation in peace and security processes.
Implementation of the WPS agenda in Yemen by the international community has been haphazard and superficial. In establishing the Yemeni Women’s Pact for Peace and Security (known as “Tawafuq”), the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen (OSESGY) and UN Women bypassed existing Yemeni women’s networks, such as the Yemeni Women’s Union, which had 4 million members nationwide in 2020, and the Women’s National Committee, which has branches in every governorate. Selection criteria for Tawafuq were opaque; the group was later sidelined by the Yemeni women’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG), whose members were handpicked by the OSESGY’s gender advisor, again without transparently communicated processes.
In the meantime, women’s needs and inputs on the ground have been overlooked by the international community, for whom it is easier to talk to well-educated, anglophone women in the diaspora. Many women inside Yemen, who do not speak English and lack easy access to the donor community, do not feel heard.
In its resolutions and presidential statements, the UN Security Council has addressed WPS issues only sparingly. A narrow interpretation of the WPS agenda in Yemen has limited the focus to women’s participation in the future Track 1 peace process. This has led to competition between UN staff and increased divisions among Yemeni women. As a result, Yemeni women have been unable to define their participation in the UN-led negotiation process on their own terms.
Meanwhile, women’s political participation is not a panacea for Yemen’s lack of gender equality: The “add women and stir” approach has serious shortcomings. It fails to address lopsided power relations between men and women and runs a risk of cooptation by the warring parties and status quo actors. A quota approach unsupported by additional safeguards and policies is unlikely to result in transformative change.
A key, although so far overlooked, instrument for the implementation of WPS in the Yemeni peace process is the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Yemen ratified in 1984. CEDAW provides a legal basis for implementation of the WPS agenda. In addition, CEDAW presents a normative framework for the realization of gender equality, which is essential for sustainable peace and development. Violence and discrimination against women have a direct link to state security, while gender equality speeds up economic growth and the achievement of other development goals.
Yemen’s combined 7th and 8th periodic report will be discussed during the 80th session of the CEDAW Monitoring Committee, scheduled for October 18-November 5, 2021. It provides an excellent opportunity to put gender equality back at the top of the agenda for Yemen’s future. Its importance cannot be underestimated; sustainable peace and the achievement of development goals in Yemen depend on it – by Joke Buringa
(** B E P)
Yemen’s Economy in Crash Landing Mode: Implications and Options
Yemen has plunged into a complex, severe, and multifaceted economic crisis driven by widespread macroeconomic instability. This crisis portends that the country is on the path of a total and imminent collapse if the international community does not intervene to stop it. This precarious situation prompted the Yemeni Prime Minister, Maeen Abdul Malik, and his Foreign Minister, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, to appeal to „brotherly and friendly countries“ to provide urgent support to rescue the economy and cushion the risks and repercussions arising from it.
This paper highlights the indicators of an imminent economic collapse in Yemen, its repercussions, and the options available to avoid such a collapse in the first place.
An economy on the brink of collapse
Based on macroeconomic indicators, a cumulative and complex economic crisis that Yemen is experiencing today puts the country on the brink of a total economic collapse. Among the most important of these indicators are the following:
An economy in the doldrums. The real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the period 2014-2020 recorded a cumulative contraction of about 50%. From 2014 to 2018, it plummeted from $42.45 billion to $23.49 billion.
The annual growth rate of GDP declined from 7.7% in 2010 to 0.5% in April 2021. In the 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, the annual report that measures the elements of countries‘ economic competitiveness and their ability to grow, Yemen ranked 140 out of 141 countries. In the Doing Business 2020 report, which assesses the business and investment environment in 190 countries, Yemen ranked 187 globally, regressing from 133 in 2014.
Inflation jumped from 8% in 2014 to 30.6% in 2021, leading to the collapse of the national currency. The Yemeni riyal exchange rate against foreign currencies fell to unprecedented levels. In government-controlled areas, the exchange rate of the riyal slumped to more than 1,000 riyals against the US dollar. Inflation and the depreciation of the currency translated into a sharp rise in prices and a decline in commercial activities, and the unemployment rate reached 13.42% in 2020.
The trade balance amounted to -8,693.91 million US dollars in 2020, mainly due to a major decline in exports, especially oil and gas. Compared to 2014 figures, Yemen’s oil and gas production plunged by 90 percent. In previous years, hydrocarbons accounted for 90 percent of the country’s exports and a third of its GDP. According to local reports, the country’s total exports have fallen by 75%, including agricultural exports, which have deteriorated by more than 70%. In the Doing Business 2020 report, Yemen ranked 188th on the Trade Across Borders Indicator. The losses resulting from the damage to foreign trade are generally estimated at about 36.285 billion US dollars.
Government debt to GDP reached 81.7% in 2020.
A severe public finance crisis. The Yemeni public budget suffers from a swelling deficit as a result of the drop in the internationally recognized government’s revenue from customs and taxes due to a deteriorating business environment (the decline in taxes and customs does not apply to the Houthi authority in Sana’a), as well as due to the slump in exports, particularly oil and gas, the revenue of which accounted for about three-quarters of the government’s total income. What made matters worse was the depletion of a $2 billion Saudi deposit, which has enabled the central bank to cover basic imports since mid-2018. Undoubtedly, the public finance crisis plays a major role in accelerating the country’s drift toward an economic collapse. The budget deficit, for example, has led to a decline in government expenditure and spending on public services to unprecedented levels with which even minimal economic requirements cannot be met. Also, government investment spending is almost at a standstill, which eventually hit economic activity. On the other hand, this deficit has continued to impose inflationary pressures on the country’s economy. The government finds itself facing a difficult trade-off, either stopping financing the deficit through printing money, or continuing with this policy to meet its obligations. However, the failure to meet such stressful obligations will put the government’s future on the line.
(** B E H P)
Saudi decision threatens to plunge millions more Yemenis into poverty
Riyadh decides to cut the number of foreign workers in the kingdom
Dr. Fouad al-Baadani (not his real name) is a Yemeni academic who has been working at Saudi Arabia’s Najran University for the past three years along with more than a hundred other Yemeni academics and staff.
“I don’t mind the kingdom taking any measure that guarantees its security, but we reside here on a legal basis and we were recruited from Yemeni universities to teach here, and we wind up getting treated in this way,” he told The Media Line.
Riyadh should study the matter and be aware of the problems that many thousands of Yemeni families will suffer because of the decision, Baadani said.
A decree to banish Yemeni labor
Nahari and Baadani are two out of nearly 700,000 Yemenis who could be deported if the decision is fully implemented, according to preliminary statistics compiled by activists along with the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs in the Houthi-controlled de facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen.
The above figure could easily rise due to the current lack of accurate and updated lists of the Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia.
Mohammed al-Nuwaira, foreign relations officer in the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen’s internationally recognized government, told The Media Line, “The decree is not official yet, but employers notified the Yemeni workers in four southern provinces [Asir, Najran, Al-Bahah, Jizan] that there are orders to cancel the work contracts with them and deport them within a period not exceeding four months.”
The decision could harm more than five million Yemenis who are entirely dependent on the remittances sent by Yemeni laborers in Saudi Arabia, Nuwaira said.
A politically-charged decree
Waheeb al-Qadi, an official in the internationally recognized government’s Ministry of Expatriate Affairs in Aden, believes that the Saudi decision came due to the military operations of the De Facto Authorities (DFA), or Houthi, forces on the Yemen-Saudi border, and that the kingdom is seeking, through this regulation, to secure its borders from any breach that might be committed by Yemeni workers.
Qadi added that the decision would harm Yemenis’ standard of living, “especially since this decision may apply to, according to preliminary statistics from the Ministry [of Expatriate Affairs], more than 800,000 Yemeni workers in these provinces and therefore the damage will affect at least three million members of their families in Yemen.”
Qadi also said that most of these families depend entirely on their relatives who work in Saudi Arabia.
Reoccurring economic crisis
Eman Abdullah, a journalist for SABA, the Yemen state news agency for the DFA, or Houthis, told The Media Line the Saudi decision would have no less impact than the crisis of 1990-1991, when Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemeni laborers and other Arab Gulf states followed suit in retribution for the country’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War – By Mohammed Al-Hassani
(** B H)
Seeking healthcare in Taiz, a city split by a frontline
Located in the highlands of south-western Yemen, near the port city of Mocha on the Red Sea, Taiz is the third most populous city of Yemen. It became a home to violence within weeks of the eruption of conflict in the country in 2015. Since then, there has hardly been a day when the people of Taiz have slept peacefully without shelling, gun fires, rocket attacks or airstrikes.
The marks of bullets and shells on the houses and the piles of collapsed structures caused by the airstrikes illustrate the story of destruction by the war that has entered its seventh year. After years of intense fighting, the frontline of the battle in Taiz forms a scar across the city. It runs from east to west, with Al-Houban, once a neighbourhood of Taiz, separated from the rest of the city.
Covered with landmines, the frontline through the middle of the city is now a no-man’s land, watched over by snipers. This has bestowed the cultural capital of Yemen with a new name: the city of snipers.
A city split in two
The city centre is cut off from the rest of the country. Taiz city is under the administration of the internationally recognised government of Yemen, whereas the northern side of the city is in the Ansar Allah-controlled part of Taiz governorate.
A journey from Taiz city to Al-Houban that took 10 minutes before the conflict now takes about five to six hours to avoid the frontline. The people travel miles through the mountains before turning back in the same direction they came, just to reach an area that they can see from their rooftop on a clear day. This has largely restricted people’s movement, making travel between the two neighbourhoods expensive, time consuming and exhausting.
Just like any other part of Yemen, the conflict in Taiz has brought significant economic challenges for people. They have seen prices of food and other necessities shooting up, sometimes up to 500 times since the fighting began. People’s buying power has reduced at the same time. Government employees, especially healthcare workers working for public hospitals, are rarely paid, leading to the closure of several medical facilities.
Healthcare inaccessible or unaffordable
The healthcare system hasn’t been able to escape consequences of the war. More than half of Yemen’s public health facilities are fully or partially non-functional. Some of those that are open are on the brink of shutting down, lacking medicines, staff and funds. Meanwhile, the private healthcare system is not affordable for the people who already struggle to buy food.
MSF supporting pressing healthcare needs in Taiz The people of Taiz are largely dependent on the support provided by humanitarian organisations. MSF has been supporting the health services since early 2016, a few months after the conflict erupted in 2015.
In 2020, after an in-depth assessment of several medical facilities and through discussions with patients, community groups and key stakeholders, we identified free and specialised secondary level reproductive healthcare services to be one of the main needs for the people of Taiz.
urge humanitarian organisations to support healthcare facilities to ensure basic care to women close to their houses.”
Considering Taiz’s large and densely packed population, the conflict has brought catastrophic damage to the city. Being a hub for economic, educational and healthcare facilities for the region, the city’s siege has created a negative trickledown impact, on not only the city and the governorate, but also the surrounding areas.
The tangible damage to the city is enormous, and without hope of a better tomorrow, the longstanding conflict is also shaping a mental health catastrophe for the people at large.
(** B H K P)
Update on the civil war in Yemen and the fighting in Marib (2/2). The city of Marib caught up in the fighting of an endless civil war
In a conflict where the positions of the belligerents are changing rapidly, the Yemenis refugees in Marib and enjoying relative food and human security have seen the positions of the Houthi rebels approach the last government stronghold in the north of the country from January 2020 and thus upset their position. day-to-day. The Houthis then seized the capital of al-Jawf province, north of Marib, before moving closer to the city’s energy infrastructure. The United Nations Secretary General António Guterres then called for a national ceasefire on March 25, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the fighting then subsided for a few months. However, the latter resumed again in February 2021. From the ancient legendary civilization to the place of refuge of thousands of Yemenis,In the end, Marib did not escape the civil war and thus became, by virtue of its strategic position and its resources, the “mother battle” of the conflict.
Therefore, the Battle of Marib becomes crucial for the belligerents fighting in Yemen. The Houthi rebels are trying to expel the presidential forces of the President of the Republic Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi from this governorate. Determining for the future positions of the armed groups, the Battle of Marib is of significant strategic importance. If the rebels establish themselves there, their control over the northern half of Yemen could allow them to gain territorial power and thus legitimacy at the negotiating table with Saudi Arabia, says journalist Madjid Zerrouky du Monde [ 21 ]. Researchers from the International Crisis Group then assert that the Houthis should be able to gain other territories, starting with Shebwa, that government forces could abandon in the event of defeat and withdrawal [ 22 ] . But the Houthis could notably lose a lot in this battle, as confirmed by Franck Mermier, anthropologist and research director at CNRS, North Yemeni territory ” [ 23 ]
Yemen could, however, see fighting and violence escalate if the Houthi spread around Marib. Indeed, researcher Ahmad Nagi, affirms that “If the Houthis were indeed to win, it would open the door to further battles in Yemen’s southeastern governorates, especially Hadhramawt and Mahra, which the Houthis would not hesitate to attack. That would mean Saudi Arabia would lose its influence on the ground inside Yemen, but would begin a wider war of attrition against the Houthis ” [ 24 ].
Fighting in Marib, a never-ending nightmare for Yemenis
As early as February 2021, the International Crisis Group warned of the consequences of the fighting in Marib, asserting that „A battle for Marib city could worsen Yemen’s already dire humanitarian situation in several ways“ [ 31 ] – by Dimitri Krier
(** B K P)
Warum der Iran den Huthis im Jemen hilft, ihre Macht zu vergrößern
Die Huthis sind ein Akteur im regionalen Netzwerk des Iran, zu dem auch die die Hisbollah, die Hamas und verschiedene syrische und irakische Milizen gehören.
Die wachsende Stärke der Huthi-Bewegung ist in der gesamten Region zu spüren. Für sehr wenig Geld konnte Iran den Huthis helfen, ihre Fähigkeit, Druck auf Saudi-Arabien auszuüben, erheblich zu steigern.
Die Huthis können nun die Infrastruktur tief im Inneren des Landes angreifen. Riad behauptet, seit 2015 fast 900 Raketen und Drohnen der Huthis abgefangen zu haben (Stand: Februar 2021). Diese Zahl lässt sich nicht nachprüfen, ist aber plausibel. Zugegeben, die militärischen Auswirkungen dieser Angriffe waren begrenzt und der materielle Schaden für Saudi-Arabien war vernachlässigbar. Aber die symbolischen Folgen sind erheblich, ebenso wie die längerfristigen Auswirkungen.
Der wichtigste Trend besteht darin, dass die Huthis ihre Fähigkeit, Saudi-Arabien Schaden zuzufügen, stetig verbessert haben. Infolgedessen wird die saudische Abschreckung gegenüber den Huthis – und damit auch gegenüber dem Iran – weiter schwächer werden.
Die Huthi-Bewegung macht ihre Ambitionen im Südwesten Saudi-Arabiens immer selbstbewusster deutlich.
Die Vertiefung der Partnerschaft zwischen dem Iran und den Huthis muss auch im breiteren Kontext der iranischen Außenpolitik gesehen werden. Bis vor kurzem folgten die Beziehungen des Irans zu den von ihm unterstützten nichtstaatlichen bewaffneten Akteuren dem Modell eines Speichennetzes, bei dem der Iran im Mittelpunkt stand.
Diese Dynamik ist jedoch im Wandel begriffen: Der Iran steht nach wie vor im Zentrum der Konstellation, aber die Speichen – Hisbollah, Hamas, die Houthis und verschiedene syrische und irakische Milizen – entwickeln zunehmend direkte Beziehungen zueinander. Sie umgehen Teheran nicht, sondern entwickeln ihre eigenen Außenbeziehungen.
Dies ist ein Trend, der von Teheran aktiv gefördert wird.
Die Rolle der Huthi-Bewegung in diesem Netzwerk von durch den Iran unterstützten nichtstaatlichen Akteuren ist so stark gewachsen, dass man inzwischen von einer Huthi-Außenpolitik sprechen kann. Die Verbindungen zwischen den Huthi und der Hisbollah sind besonders deutlich geworden, da die beiden Bewegungen zunehmend in Bereichen von der Ausbildung bis zum Waffenschmuggel zusammenarbeiten.
Einigen Berichten zufolge wird der Jemen auch zunehmend als Plattform für den Iran genutzt, um Waffen an andere von ihm unterstützte bewaffnete Gruppen zu liefern, insbesondere an die Hamas.
Die Huthi-Bewegung ist inzwischen eine regionale Macht, die bei der Verfolgung ihrer regionalen Interessen immer mehr Erfahrung und Geschick beweist – vonThomas Juneau
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HOW IRAN HELPED HOUTHIS EXPAND THEIR REACH
Since 2015, when Saudi Arabia launched its intervention in Yemen, the Houthi movement has deepened its ties with Iran and grown more powerful on the ground. As a result, the impact of the Iranian-Houthi partnership will increasingly be felt beyond Yemen’s borders. As I have argued elsewhere, the Houthis are now developing their own foreign policy, forming direct ties with other Iranian partners in the region and presenting a growing risk to rivals like Saudi Arabia and, eventually, Israel. In recent years, some of the most alarmist coverage of the Houthi movement has presented the group in simplistic terms as an Iranian proxy inside Yemen. In fact, the partnership is more complex than a patron-proxy one, but it still carries real risks for regional security.
It is impossible to precisely quantify how much of the Houthi movement’s success is the result of Iranian support. A significant portion of Houthi assets have been generated locally: Large portions of their arsenal come from absorbing — by negotiation or coercion — units of the Yemeni military, as well as from looting national army stockpiles, forging alliances with tribal militias, and making purchases on the black market.
That said, growing Iranian support has certainly played an important role in helping the Houthis to become more powerful. In addition to providing the group with an increasing number of small arms, Iran has been delivering more advanced and lethal weapons as well. In many cases, Iran uses complex smuggling and procurement networks to provide more technologically advanced parts that the Houthis then combine with other locally acquired or produced ones. They assemble these parts into working weapons with technical assistance from Hizballah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers.
And as much as it is true that Iran increasingly supports the Houthi movement, it is equally true that Iran has bandwagoned on the Houthis’ successes. Many see the Houthis as Iranian proxies. But this is only part of the story, as the Houthis are also using their ties with Iran to advance their own interests and have been keen to expand relations. They have been under attack by a military force far superior in conventional terms, and only Iran has been willing and able to provide external support. But this does not make them pawns of Iran. There is no evidence, as some Iran hawks allege, that the Houthis take orders from Tehran or would have adopted significantly different policies absent Iranian support.
The Houthi movement’s growing strength is being felt around the region. For very little money, Iran has been able to help the Houthis to significantly increase their ability to pressure Saudi Arabia
The Houthi movement’s role in this network of Iran-backed non-state actors has grown to the point that it is now possible to refer to Houthi foreign policy. Houthi-Hizballah ties have become particularly prominent, as the two movements increasingly cooperate in areas ranging from training to weapons smuggling.
The Houthi movement is now a regional power, demonstrating ever greater experience and skill as it pursues its interests in the region. The Houthis have emerged from Yemen’s civil war as an increasingly important element in the Iranian-led constellation of revisionist actors that surrounds Saudi Arabia and Israel. They also provide Iran with new options for targeting American forces in the Middle East. Houthi leaders will not attack Iran’s enemies solely based on orders from Tehran — that is not how their partnership functions. In a hypothetical escalation, the Houthi leadership would have to balance its multiple interests, notably the need to preserve Iranian support, the risk of American retaliation, and the politics of maintaining their position inside Yemen. Nonetheless, the Houthi’s newfound reach has enhanced Iran’s deterrence posture and its ability to project power — all at very little cost to Tehran – by Thomas Juneau
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Yemen. The Socotra Archipelago Threatened by the Civil War
Cut off from the rest of the world for many years and preserved from the turmoil in Yemen, the Socotra Archipelago is gradually losing its peaceful reputation. As in all the Southern provinces, the separatist movement has split the population. It finds favour among some of the islanders who have the support of the United Arab Emirates and are in open conflict with those who reject any and every outside interference.
One night, at the end of April 2020, two boatloads of armed TCS soldiers from the mainland put an end to peace in the archipelago. The checkpoints, the police stations, the military port, the airport and the governor’s office were taken after a few skirmishes, especially in Haybak, soon followed by Hadiboh, the governor, Ramzi Mahrus, decamped. The coup was a success. “Three hundred mercenaries, who were not from Socotra, gathered on a Friday in Hadiboh with their heavy weapons and armoured vehicles. They fired into the air for three straight hours in order to frighten the people. Everybody was scared. This was the first time anything of the sort had happened here. It was Socotra’s saddest day,” says Ali Saad, who works with Essa Bin Yaqoot. Henry Thomson, a member of a group of UN experts, himself specialising in armed groups, bears him out. “I have heard from several sources that those TCS troops came from Aden, from Ad Dali or from Lahij. They landed from fishing boats in the middle of the night.” But according to Raft Al-Taqlee, this is a lie. “Those are fake news spread by the Muslim Brotherhood. No soldier from any other province came to help us [take power].”
The Southern Movement was not supported only by the other southern provinces favourable to the TCS. Since it joined the war on the side of the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi rebels, the United Arab Emirates have been supporting the separatist entity in South Yemen and this in spite of its commitment to the central government and its proclamations in support of a stable, unified Yemen. Moreover, the Emirates enjoy huge popularity on the island province. The ties between the archipelago and the oil-rich emirates go back a long way.
In May 2018, under pretext of building a staging ground for its war against the Houthis and terrorism in Yemen, Abu Dhabi landed four warplanes and a hundred soldiers on the island. Islanders in Hadiboh were shocked by this military display and organised street protests demanding their immediate departure. The Yemeni President in exile and local authorities called upon Saudi Arabia to act as mediator. After a few weeks, the Emirati troops finally withdrew. But the pattern was set. Inhabited by lowly fishermen, livestock breeders and small shopkeepers, a part of the island is sympathetic to the CTS promises of investment, backed by the Emirates. These Socotris welcome the idea of a separation between the South and the North, for the latter is seen as responsible for all the civil wars, the generalised corruption, the island’s underdevelopment and above all the total cessation of tourism.
Gradually, the island became split three ways, between pro-TCS and pro-Emirates and those who would like to see Socotra remain under the authority of the central government, at the same time hoping that when the war is over, it would gain more autonomy in a federal system. Thus, frequent street protests break out in Hadiboh demanding the departure of Ramzi Mahrus, the governor of Socotra whose openly distrustful attitude towards the Emirati humanitarian aid has quickly made him the symbol of a corrupt and inefficient government administered by Al-Islah, accused of fronting for the Muslim Brother—hood. A narrative adopted by many pro-TCS activists, quite in line with the Emirati policy of opposing the Brotherhood throughout the Middle East.
Asked by the central government to send in reinforcements to prevent an outright conflict between separatists and pro-governmentals, Saudi Arabia has established several military bases on the island. Several hundred soldiers are now stationed on Socotra. A supply plane flying non-stop from Saudi Arabia lands every week on the island.
While a few charitable initiatives are organised occasionally, the Saudis deployed on Socotra scarcely affect the present tensions in the archipelago. “They have two presidents here, Hadi, the head of the central government, and Aidarus al-Zubaidi, the head of TCS,” I am told by a Saudi soldier.
The former Governor Ramzi Mahrus claims to have warned them of an imminent coup. In vain. “We had learned from the authorities of other provinces that the mercenaries [Southerners] had arrived. The Saudi generals, supposed to be allied with the Yemeni government, promised us to prevent any coup d’état but they did nothing.” A Saudi officer who wishes to remain anonymous, told me the truth of the matter: “We control the TCS here. We have even supplied them with weapons and combat vehicles.” Ramzi Mahrus revealed that he had asked his followers not to fight back: “I was in office as the legal authority, but I decided to withdraw in order to avoid a blood-bath.”
It seems quite unlikely that the TCS coup could have taken place without the prior approval of Riyadh. Did the Emirates make a deal with their allies whereby the separatists could take over Socotra? In any case, this is the belief of the Committee elected by the peaceful sit-in on the Socotra Archipelago, assembling the island’s tribal dignitaries.
In the months that followed, activists or ordinary citizens having criticised the TCS leadership or UAE interference on WhatsApp were arrested and clapped into gaol. Activist Abdullah Badhan is the latest of these. After posting on Facebook snapshots revealing the existence of an Emirati heliport on the island, he had been arrested and gaoled but released a few days later.
However, while the military invasion by TCS would not have been possible without the political and logistic backing of the United Arab Emirates, it remains to be seen whether Abu Dhabi has taken control of the archipelago. What the Emirates are after on Socotra remains very unclear. Many rumours, spread by Qatari and Turkish media or by Yemeni personalities hostile to the UAE, have either denounced the construction of an Israeli base on Socotra or claimed that foreign tourists were arriving from Abu Dhabi without the approval of the Yemeni government. There has even been talk of the illegal entrance of Israeli holidaymakers. Fake news galore, aimed at criticising Emirati meddling.
But despite these fears, there is no Emirati military, seaport or tourist construction project under way on Socotra. Emirati military presence appears negligible, and the financial backing of the UAE promised TCS a year ago, has never arrived.
Having lost the financial support of the Emirates, the TCS on Socotra has to deal with the discontentment of part of its grass-roots constituency. For the past year, civil servants’ wages are no longer paid regularly while under the governorship of Ramzi Mahrus they were.
Raft Al-Taqlee, head of the Southern separatist movement on Socotra, made a confession: “We are faced with many difficulties. Such as the arrears in the wages of the military and security personnel and civil service workers. The government does not assume its responsibilities. And there is an administrative vacuum on Socotra. A new governor ought to be appointed very soon. But we refuse to accept the idea of Socotra being governed by radical or extremist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, we appeal to our brothers in the Arab Coalition and the international community to respect our wishes – by Quentin Müller
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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45 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,829 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 16 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 8 others.
4,108 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
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33 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,784 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 12 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 11 others.
3,315polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added
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Yemen gets first batch of J&J COVID-19 vaccines
Yemen received its first shipment of COVID-19 vaccines made by Johnson & Johnson on Sunday, roughly 151,000 doses, the health ministry said.
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40 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,751 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 25 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 3 others.
3,664 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added
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35 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,711 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 24 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 3 others.
4,047 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
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51 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,676 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 34 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 6 others.
4,047 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
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45 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,625 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 13 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 14 others.
3,800 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
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New batch of Covid-19 vaccine due next week in Yemen
A new bach of coronavirus vaccine is due to arrive in Yemen next week, the Minister of Public Health and Population in the internationally recognised government Qasem Buhaybih said on Tuesday.
41 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,580 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 19 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 4 others.
4,116 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
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Covid-19 forces Yemeni [Hadi] gov’t to reopen isolation centers
The Yemeni government-affiliated supreme committee to combat Covid-19 decided on Saturday to reopen isolation centers and resume incentive payments for workers, as part of efforts to counter the third wave of the pandemic amid the recent increase in infections.
At a virtual meeting chaired by Yemen’s prime minister, the committee chose to accelerate the erection of some oxygen plants and to cope with any problems faced in the first and second waves so as to curb the pandemic, the Riyadh-based Saba said.
PM Maeen Abdulmalek underscored the „need to ensure that the existing isolation centers are provided with medical and oxygen supplies, to coordinate with organizations and donors, and to keep following all the precautions strictly.“
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QRCS rehabilitates six COVID-19 health care centers in Yemen
Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) has launched a project to restore and equip six health centers in Sanaa and Taiz, Yemen, in order to provide health care services for COVID-19 patients.
Assessing Antimicrobial Resistance, Utilization, and Stewardship in Yemen: An Exploratory Mixed-Methods Study
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR), largely driven by irrational use of antimicrobials, is a global, multifaceted problem calling for a complete understanding of all contributory factors for effective containment. In conflict settings, war-wounds and malnutrition can combine with existing social determinants to increase demand for antibiotics, compounding irrational use. In this study, we focus on Yemen, a low-income country with active conflict for the last 5 years, and analyze the current status of awareness and stewardship efforts regarding AMR. We performed a survey of prescribers/physicians and pharmacists to describe perceptions of AMR prevalence, antibiotic use practices, and stewardship in Yemen, supported by a nonsystematic scoping literature review and a key informant interview.
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Dengue fever in Taiz, Yemen: 4,770 cases since the beginning of the year
Health officials in Yemen said this week that 4,770 cases of dengue fever had been detected in Taiz governorate in the southwestern part of the country since the beginning of the year through the end of July.
Taysir Al-Sami’i, Deputy Director of Information at the Ministry of Health’s office in Taiz said the neighborhoods of the city of Taiz, the capital of the governorate, recorded a greatest spread of the disease compared to other areas in the most populous governorate in Yemen.
He attributed the spread of dengue fever to several reasons, most notably the spread of mosquitoes that transmit the disease, and the health authorities’ preoccupation with confronting the COVID-19 epidemic, which led to the neglect of other infectious diseases.
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Yemen War Daily Map Updates
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Lawyers seek ICC probe into alleged war crimes in Yemen
Human rights lawyers representing hundreds of victims of Yemen’s civil war are calling on the International Criminal Court to open an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition during the devastating conflict.
British lawyer Toby Cadman filed the request Monday, highlighting three separate incidents — an August 2018 airstrike that destroyed a school bus and killed dozens; a missile attack in October 2016 that killed at least 110 people; and allegations of torture and murder of civilians being held in prisons in the south of Yemen.
The filing came a day after a missile and drone attack, blamed on the Houthi rebels, on a key military base in Yemen’s south killed at least 30 troops.
Lawyer Almudena Bernabeu, representing victims of the school bus attack, said that the coalition said it would investigate the deadly strike and bring those responsible to justice.
“Of course, they did no such thing,” Bernabeu said in a statement. “As the court of last resort, victims and families have no choice but to call on the International Criminal Court to ensure justice is done.”
A written submission filed by the lawyers says Jordan deployed fighter jets to the coalition, Senegal provided troops, while the Maldives supported it diplomatically.
The lawyers also allege that crimes were committed in Yemen by mercenaries from another ICC member state, Colombia.
“The ICC can and must use its clear jurisdiction to investigate these undeniable and evidenced crimes,” said Cadman.
The ICC, set up to investigate crimes in countries that are unable or unwilling to prosecute them, receives hundreds of requests each year to open investigations. Many are rejected as falling outside its jurisdiction, others are studied to establish whether they merit a full-scale investigation. It can take years for the court’s prosecutors to decide whether to open an investigation.
Cadman said that lawyers for Yemeni victims are also looking at other ways of seeking justice.
“While our campaign begins at the International Criminal Court, we intend to fight our case using all and every legal avenue available. Those who perpetrate the worst crimes can and will be held accountable,” Cadman said.
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The people of Yemen deserve justice for war crimes – so why hasn’t it been delivered yet?
We are raising a submission today before the International Criminal Court on behalf of more than 200 victims and their families, calling for an investigation into inhumane attacks
Three years ago in Yemen, a missile struck a school bus killing 26 children, more bystanders, and maiming close to 100. There was no military target, no opposing soldiers, no militants, no reason. Just a stationary bus and a driver gone to seek water for thirsty kids, while others shopped for groceries in the local market. When families came to collect the dead, the blast had been so devastating some were unable to recover any body parts at all.
There have been so many more attacks just like the school bus in Yemen over the last six years, during the world’s worst and least known war. From a double missile launch on an indoor funeral delivering death for hundreds and life changing injury for more, to the use of foreign mercenaries in combat and torture – they risk being nothing but stories: truths, detailed by international NGOs, and reported in the world’s media – but not evidence laid out in any courtroom where such crimes of war and inhumanity should be held to account. For in Yemen there is no tribunal and there will be no trial to hear these charges. The victims would never secure one.
Nor can anyone believe the words of the coalition’s public relations officials – who claimed, after these attacks, there would be investigations. They are, after all, just three incidents in a six-year war of 20,000 airstrikes, a quarter of a million deaths, and four million civilian displacements. For this coalition, three is a number that must surely move no heart. A school bus, a funeral, and abuse and death at the hands of foreign mercenaries: this is nothing.
That’s why we raise a submission today before the International Criminal Court at the Hague in Europe on behalf of more than 200 victims and their families. When many of the applicants remain living in Yemen, they risk their lives to submit it. No matter: they call on the world’s court to launch an investigation into these three incidents – and many more – and start to assuage their grief – by Toby Cadman, Almudena Bernabeu
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With Saudi Green Light, Yemen’s GPC to Victimize Hadi in Road to Recovery
Along with the relative stagnation on Yemen battlegrounds, the anti-Sana’a coalition of Yemeni and foreign actors is reviewing its alliances and reshaping its internal structures to adapt to the changes and dynamics happening in the game environment.
As part of these efforts, leaders of General People’s Congress (GPC) have met in Abu Dhabi and took steps towards a peace initiative, reports suggested. One of the terms of the initiative was cutting off support to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, removing him from presidency in the Aden-based administration, and replacing him with Ahmad Saleh, the son of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
In April 2015, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Ahmad Saleh under Resolution 2216, accusing him of participating in activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen. The sanctions imposed a travel ban on him.
However, a recent letter sent to the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres by Hadi’s Foreign Minister Ahmad bin Mubarak and earlier negotiations with the former special UN envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths demonstrated the Saudi and Emirati plans to ditch Hadi and bring to power the former president’s son. Saleh’s recent meeting with Netherlands ambassador to the UAE gave signs that the Western sides were preparing to lift his sanctions.
Elaph newspaper of Saudi Arabia in an article reported that Riyadh was pursuing Hadi removal from the political scene under the excuse of critical health and aging conditions. The newspaper noted that the most important current candidate to replace Hadi was Ahmad Saleh. It further said that the UNSC, including Russia and China, was moving in this direction and pursuing sanctions relief.
On the other hand, the UAE appointed Saleh president of the recent GPC conference as a replacement to Hadi in preparation to name him president of the ousted regime.
Earlier, media had revealed that Ahmad arranged an agreement among GPC’s branch in the west coast, the UAE-backed militia there led by his cousin Tareq Saleh, and GPC’s Sana’a branch led by Saleh Abu Ra’as.
Observers hold that the efforts to appoint Ahmad Saleh as the leader of the GPC at present is a difficult job, given the massive differences that tore apart the party.
Currently, the GPC is going through tough times due to fragile domestic conditions, lack of financial resources, and regional and international pressures.
The internal rift between the party leaders is one of the most important challenges facing the party leaders in restoring the place in Yemen developments. Currently, the GPC has relations with Sana’a, Cairo, and Riyadh.
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Yemen: UAE, Israel Occupying Mayyun Island to Exploit Its Strategic Position
A senior Yemeni official said the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Israeli regime are occupying the Yemeni volcanic island of Mayyun in the Strait of Mandeb — which lies at the Southern entrance to the Red Sea — to exploit its strategic geographic position.
Member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Ahmed Al-Rahwi told the Arabic-language Al-Masirah television network that the forced displacement of people from the island, also known as Perim, points to a scheme aimed at asserting overwhelming dominance over the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
Rahwi said former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, shortly after the Saudi-led devastating military campaign against Yemen, said the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb lies in its geographic position.
“Over the past years, the UAE has aggressively sought to displace the islanders and construct a military installation [on Mayyun island] in line with US and Israeli orders,” the Yemeni official said.
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Yemen to get $665 mln of IMF reserves in new SDR allocation
Yemen will receive about $665 million worth of reserves from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Monday which will help ease an acute economic and humanitarian crisis in the war-torn country, the fund’s regional representative for Yemen said.
The distribution is part of a $650 billion IMF allocation of Special Drawing Rights – the fund’s unit of exchange backed by dollars, euros, yen, sterling and yuan – which states receive in proportion with their existing quota shareholding.
„The SDR allocation will boost Yemen’s foreign exchange reserves by over 70%, providing much needed support to help address the crisis, including with the many urgent food and medical needs of the population,“ IMF regional representative Gazi Shbaikat said in a statement to Reuters.
and from the Houthi side:
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Saudi-led Hadi puppet government withdraws last of Yemen’s funds from IMF
The Saudi-backed exiled Hadi government has withdrawn the last reserve in new allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for Yemen from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), according to media sources.
Majed al-Daare, the editor-in-chief of Moragboon Press website loyal to the coalition, confirmed that the government of Hadi has withdrawn the last deposit of $665 million from Yemen’s external reserve in the IMF.
He considered that withdrawing the Yemeni reserve from the IMF is “a national betrayal in an attempt to destroy what remains of the collapsed national economy.”
On Monday, the Saudi-controlled Central Bank in Aden received about $665 million worth of reserves from the IMF, to achieve what it called “stability in the exchange rates of the local currency against foreign currencies.”
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
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Effects of the fuel embargo at Al Hodeidah port on fuel supply dynamics and fuel prices
The Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) suspended fuel imports through Al Hodeidah port in June 2020 and has since permitted only limited and occasional imports via this route.
The suspension has not led to a shortage in fuel supply to areas under the control of the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) even though the port provided almost half of the monthly fuel import volumes to the country. In-country supply chains quickly adjusted, enabling overland transport of fuel to the more lucrative market in DFA-controlled areas from ports in IRG areas to offset the reduction in supply through Al Hodeidah. This has resulted in some shortages in IRG-controlled areas.
The IRG has benefitted financially from additional customs and duty revenue on fuel imported via the south, while the DFA has mitigated the lost fuel import revenue at Al Hodeidah port by collecting the duty at inland customs checkpoints.
Overall, the Al Hodeidah suspension has increased already high fuel prices for consumers and aggravated shortages that affect the Yemeni people and their livelihoods.
In DFA [Sanaa gov.]-controlled areas:
Despite adequate fuel supply, the authorities have rationed fuel for the end consumer on the official market. Fuel is not being rationed on the parallel market, which receives most of the supply. Fuel is sold at an inflated price on the parallel market.
The DFA has continued to generate revenues from the fuel imports trucked overland. These revenues are meant to pay outstanding public sector employee salaries but are unlikely to be used for that purpose.
Fuel rationing and increased prices are negatively affecting the budgets of households, humanitarian organisations, and the private sector. This leads to further pressure on households, especially those with already limited purchasing power; potentially reduces the resources and capacity of humanitarian organisations to implement their programmes; and disrupts the production capacity of businesses and market supply. • Higher fuel prices and transportation costs limit people’s mobility and diminish the provision of services at affordable prices.
Fuel rationing and increased fuel prices are likely to reduce the delivery of food, goods, medicine, and trucked water, leading to shortages of goods, reduced access to affordable clean drinking water, and interruptions in supply chains.
High fuel prices will increase the cost of irrigating land, in seasons when needed, possibly leading to a significant reduction in local agricultural production. Fuel price increases have affected the production of food transported between governorates, raising fruit and vegetable prices.
In IRG [Hadi-gov.]-controlled areas:
Fuel prices have been rising with the further depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) against the US dollar (USD). The lucrative business of supplying fuel to DFA-controlled areas has resulted in a greater proportion of fuel going to DFA areas instead of to IRG areas, and market disruptions were observed.
Reduced mobility and service delivery and limited access caused by high fuel prices could further affect people and their livelihoods, including local food production, fisheries, and humanitarian operations (as observed in DFA areas).
All of Yemen:Significant fuel price rises over the past few years have had a negative impact on consumers in both DFA and IRG areas. Fuel will potentially become increasingly unaffordable
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YOC: departure of oil ship held for 8 months to destination outside Yemen
The Yemeni Oil Company has said the vessel VOSS SPIRIT, which loaded with 29,987 tons of diesel, has left the detention area for a destination outside Yemen.
official spokesman for YOC Issam al-Mutawakil said the vessel authorized by the United Nations was forced to leave after it was prevented from reaching the port of Hodeida and was detained by the US-Saudi aggression coalition
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
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Yemen’s new school year kicks off as 6 million children at risk
The new school year started in Yemen’s government-held areas on Aug. 15 and in areas held by Houthi rebels Aug. 14, as the UN is saying children’s education has become one of the greatest casualties of conflict in the war-torn country.
UNICEF said when children are out of school, they „become more vulnerable to being coerced into labor or recruited into the fighting,“ warning that „the number of children facing education disruption in Yemen could rise to 6 million.“
Katharina Ritz, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross‘ (ICRC) delegation in Yemen, said in a tweet that the conflict has „rendered about 3 million children unable to enroll this year. Yemeni children, like all children, need to go back to school.“
Ali Mutahar, 43, an English teacher in a public school, has also taught at private schools for four years. “Because of salary cuts, I had to look out for my livelihood by teaching at private schools,” Mutahar told Al-Monitor outside his class at Ardh al-Janateen Private School in Sanaa.
Mutahar is one of “two-thirds of the teaching workforce — over 170,000 teachers“ that UNICEF said “have not received a regular salary for four years because of the conflict and geopolitical divides.” UNICEF added, This puts around 4 million additional children at risk of disrupted education or dropping out as unpaid teachers quit teaching to find other ways of providing for their families.”
Asked how he left his official job in the Houthi-run Education Ministry, he said, “I tell them ‘taking a life is easier than cutting off a livelihood’ (citing an Arabic proverb),” pointing out that when he told the education authorities he had „nine sons to feed and can’t work with no salary, they understood and allowed me to work in private schools.“
Al-Monitor visited four public schools in Shoub district in Sanaa asking if there were any teachers who had quit teaching. We didn’t find any in these schools, but one teacher at Hassan Bin Thabet Harmal School, located adjacent to the headquarters of the Ministry of Education, said last year he went to get married to a second wife without obtaining permission from the school and returned to find that he had been dismissed from his job. “I paid 170,000 riyals [ $280] in fines before I could return to my class.“
Funded by (WFP), More than 53 thousand people benefit from malnutrition treatment project in July
With the aim of contributing to the treatment of severe and moderate acute malnutrition cases for children under five years of age, and treating pregnant and lactating mothers with moderate acute malnutrition, HUMAN ACCESS, in partnership with World Food Program (WFP), implemented a project to address malnutrition cases during the month of July in the governorates of Taiz, Lahj and Marib Governorate, which benefited (53,963) individuals.
This project provided a number of diverse programs, including the provision of therapeutic feeding services to children with severe acute malnutrition through mobile clinics and fixed centers, benefiting approximately 328 boys and girls.
The project also offered therapeutic feeding services for moderately malnourished children to (3,594) boys and girls, while (13,627) children under two years of age benefited from preventive foods.
Implementation of life skills, marketing and financial course in Shabwa
HUMAN ACCESS in Shabwa Governorate, in partnership with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), implemented a course targeting 15 women and girls trainees in the field of life skills, financial and marketing, within the protection and livelihood support project (vocational training and economic empowerment).
and more work of Human Access: https://humanaccess.org/m/news/training-program-in-culinary-women-yemen
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Katharina Ritz leitet IKRK-Delegation im Jemen: «Routine kann zum Sicherheitsrisiko werden»
Katharina Ritz fiel mir auf, als sie in Fernsehinterviews über die Lage im Jemen sprach. Sie tat es mit einer Gelassenheit und gleichzeitig mit einer Fürsorglichkeit, die berührte. Während viele, Frauen wie Männer, selbst nach einer kurzen Zeit in der humanitären Arbeit erschöpft oder desillusioniert sind, scheint ihr Engagement selbst nach 25 Jahren im Feld ungebrochen. Wir begegnen uns im Frühjahr, als sie ferienhalber in der Schweiz weilt. Katharina Ritz ist 53 Jahre alt, zierlich, trägt Jeans, Pullover, das Gesicht ungeschminkt, sie hat eine warme, dunkle Stimme. Sie lädt zum Gespräch in ihre Wohnung.
Wie stark empfinden Sie die Kluft zwischen eben dieser Schweizer Normalität und dem Alltag, so wie Sie Ihn während Ihrer Einsätze erleben?
Ganz am Anfang meiner Zeit beim IKRK hatte ich das Gefühl, dass mich hier niemand versteht. Und umgekehrt dachte ich oft: Was haben die hier für banale Probleme? Heute ist mir aber sehr viel bewusster, dass Probleme relativ sind. Selbst wenn man auf einem so hohen Niveau lebt wie in der Schweiz, kann man Probleme haben. Ich sehe zum Beispiel, wie viele Menschen hier unter Einsamkeit leiden, während Einsamkeit in afrikanischen Ländern kaum ein Thema ist, weil das Individuum immer in einer Gemeinschaft eingebettet ist. Ich sehe auch, wie viel in der Schweiz gearbeitet und wie sehr in das Land investiert wird. Wir haben unser Leben so arrangiert, dass wir 15 Stunden pro Tag funktionieren können. In anderen Ländern ist die produktive Zeit relativ kurz. Man richtet sich nach dem Klima, nach der Verfügbarkeit von Strom, nach dem Licht. Im Prinzip geht es jedoch nicht um gut oder schlecht, sondern um das, was man nicht hat. Fragt man Menschen im Kongo: «Möchtest du gern so gut leben wie in der Schweiz?», sagen alle Ja. Sie sehen, was ihnen fehlt. Aber wenn sie dann hier sind, erkennen sie, was sie dafür aufgegeben haben.
Sie befinden sich quasi in einem permanenten Ausnahmezustand. Wie schaffen Sie das?
Ich denke, es macht viel aus, dass das IKRK ein Mandat hat, das ich nach wie vor spannend finde. Wir halten die Kriegsparteien dazu an, dem humanitären Recht zu folgen, und versuchen sie zu überzeugen, dass man auch mit weniger Leid Krieg führen kann. Zudem sieht man bei unserer Arbeit, was in einem Land läuft und was die Leute brauchen. Natürlich kann man sich fragen: Nützt es etwas, wenn man den Menschen zu essen gibt? Werden die Kriege dadurch nicht künstlich weitergenährt? Das kann und muss man hinterfragen.
Ein solcher war auch der Gefangenenaustausch, den Sie koordiniert haben. Wie viele schlaflose Nächte hat er Ihnen bereitet?
Wir haben die Tage vorher praktisch nicht geschlafen. Wir mussten nachverfolgen, ob alle Gefangenen registriert und transferiert waren, erstellten Kommunikationspläne, oft gabs noch Backdoor-Verhandlungen. Zwei Wochen vor dem Austausch haben wir alle der über tausend Gefangenen besucht und mit ihnen geredet. Denn unsere Grundbedingung ist: Wir bringen keine Person heim, die nicht heim will. Und wenn jemand nicht nachhause will, müssen wir wissen, warum. Es ist nicht so, dass er oder sie sagen könnte: «Meine Grossmutter geht mir auf die Nerven. » Sie müssen schon einen guten Grund haben. Insgesamt waren sechzig Mitarbeitende während dreier Tage nur mit den Interviews beschäftigt. https://www.annabelle.ch/leben/katharina-ritz-leitet-ikrk-delegation-im-jemen-jegliche-routine-kann-zum-sicherheitsrisiko-werden/
Infographic: Remote Food Security and Vulnerability Monitoring, Update #1 (Jan – June 2021)
YHF supports vulnerable groups and ensures access to safe drinking water and critical health services
The Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) is empowering aid partners to respond to the needs of vulnerable groups and scale up priority health care services and critical water assistance to millions of people in need. In July, the YHF allocated US$50 million to improve living conditions, access to assistance and protection for people with disabilities, minority groups such as the Muhamasheen, female-headed households, vulnerable children, and other people with specific needs. This was followed by an additional $5.44 million provided by the fund in August to provide fuel support to ensure that critical health facilities and water stations can continue to provide life-saving services to millions of people across Yemen.
UN: Hälfte der Menschen im Jemen hat keinen Zugang zu Trinkwasser
Laut der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) hat etwa die Hälfte der Menschen im Jemen aufgrund des Krieges keinen Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser und medizinischer Versorgung.
Islamic Relief: A gendered analysis on Cash for Work programming in Hudayda
The Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) funded Cash for Work programme in Yemen focuses on the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and WASH sectors to build upon Islamic Relief Yemen’s previous programming and work with local communities in the targeted areas of Hudayda and Lahj.
This study aims to assess the inclusion and participation of different community members in Cash for Work programming in the FSL sectors in Hudayda. The study aims to understand participants’ needs and the most effective methods of inclusion and to identify any barriers in the participation of different community members, to learn lessons and identify best practice for future humanitarian programming in Yemen.
Yesterday 28 Aug, We distributed 4 food baskets & schoolbags, books to poor families & 4 orphans students. Thanks to all our donors friends for support our humanitarian work (photos)
Back streets in poor neighborhoods play the role of flood channels leading to the #Crater #Aden tanks, in documentation prior to the intervention to change their function and redesign their features. (photo)
Film: Yemen’s Future Generation Struggles to Keep Learning
The conflict in Yemen has forced thousands of families to flee their homes, bringing the total number of out-of-school children to 2 million. After her school was hit by a missile, 13-year-old Emtinan of Al Hudaydah, Yemen -stopped going to school.
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ACAPS Thematic report: Social impact monitoring report: April – June 2021 – 26 August 2021
Economic conditions continue to worsen. The depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) and the exchange rate difference between DFA and IRG areas have led to price increases and reduced people’s purchasing power. In IRG governorates, the exchange rate reached YER 991 to 1 USD by the end of July, while in DFA-controlled areas it remained stable, trending at YER 596 to 1 USD. Food and fuel prices simultaneously increased, mainly in IRGcontrolled areas (FAO accessed 08/09/2021).
Between April–June, the forcible transfer of migrants from northern to southern governorates continued. Over 23,000 migrants were pushed across active front lines, and over 10,000 moved to southern governorates (IOM 09/08/2021).
Yemen is still experiencing the second wave of COVID-19.
UNOCHA Yemen: Organizations‘ Monthly Presence (June 2021)
In June 2021, 102 organizations implemented Humanitarian Response Plan activities in all of Yemen’s 333 districts. Eight UN agencies were active in all districts, 36 international NGOs were active in 240 districts, and 58 national NGOs were active in 311 districts. The highest number of organizations were from the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) – 46 worked in 320 districts.
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UNOCHA Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot (June 2021)
Yemen continues to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with some 20.7 million people in need of some form of humanitarian assistance or protection. In 2021, the situation, which is primarily driven by conflict and an economic collapse, has been exacerbated by COVID-19, heavy rains and flooding, and escalating hostilities. In parallel, the 2021 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) remains largely underfunded – as of June 2021 only US$1.65 billion of the $3.85 billion needed had been received. In addition, a fuel crisis has increased needs and restricted response activities, and ongoing access issues hinder the aid operation. An alarming increase in levels of food insecurity and acute malnutrition is forecasted by the year’s end. In the first six months of 2021, 168 humanitarian organizations continued to deliver aid to an average of 10.3 million people per month.
While the number of people reached with assistance decreased across many cluster areas, partners continued to provide support to millions of people – an average of 9.9 million were reached each month with food assistance, over 3.2 million were reached with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services, 529,366 were supported by Health Cluster partners and 433,890 received nutrition treatment.
SMEPS: 503 young businessmen & businesswomen are now ready to run their own businesses. Within the Vocational & Business Skills Training & Support project in #Hadhramout & #Lahij they were trained in management &financial aspects to sustain &expand their small business
UNICEF Yemen Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-year (Reporting Period: 1 January 2021 – 30 June 2021)
UNICEF continued its lifesaving multi-sectoral integrated Nutrition programming, to address close to 400,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and 2.25 million children at risk of acute malnutrition. A total of 2,378,616 children under 5 years were screened for malnutrition through multiple interventions in 2021. Out of these, 109,700 children with SAM were admitted for treatment without complications in Outpatient Treatment Programmes (OTPs), with an 88 per cent cure rate. Also, 8,488 children with SAM and complications were admitted to therapeutic feeding centres (TFCs).
The rate of displacement in the first half of 2021 notably worsened, as more than 20,000 families (140,000 individuals) were newly displaced or left their location of displacement towards a safer destination. The highest numbers of displacements were linked to tensions resulting from conflict that were observed in 49 active frontlines across Marib, Hajja, Taiz, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Lahj and Al Dhale’e.
UNICEF faces a funding gap of 49 per cent.
Food security and nutrition information systems to enhance resilience of rural households in Yemen
After more than five years of protracted conflict, Yemen continues to face an unprecedented humanitarian, social and economic crisis. Conflict, displacement and economic decline are placing immense pressure on essential basic services and the institutions that provide them. Humanitarian needs have sharply increased across all sectors since the escalation of the conflict in 2015, which has exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities, degraded community resilience and accelerated the collapse of public institutions. Due to the need for reliable and timely food security and nutrition information to inform decision-making at the national and governorate levels, FAO and the Yemeni Government, with support from the European Union (EU), implemented a comprehensive information system approach with two initial phases between 2013 and 2020.
This promising practice brief focuses on the third phase of this programme called “Strengthening food security and nutrition information and early warning system” (2019-2021).
Kuwait opens two schools in Yemen’s Hadramout
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Improve nutritional conditions of the targeted CU5 by minimizing morbidity and mortality rates of SAM cases with complications in CU5
The unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to take a toll on Yemeni civilians affecting all aspects of life. Moreover, the number of people in need of assistance increase from year to year as the conflict continues. Furthermore, the increasing difficulty of access to health care, decreasing mobility between different governorates, and the collapse of the economy are all contributing factors to the deterioration of services across the different sectors. Between April and August 2020, agencies have been forced to reduce food distributions, cut health services in more than 300 facilities and halt specialized services for hundreds of thousands of traumatized and highly vulnerable women and girls.
According to the humanitarian response plan for the year 2020, two-third of all Yemenis are hungry, and nearly don’t know when they will next eat. Twenty-five percent of the population including 2.1 million children and 1.2 million pregnant lactating women suffer from either moderate or severe malnutrition.
In 2019 Marib and Al Jawf have registered 73% and 53% of their population in need of humanitarian assistance, respectively. Regarding nutritional needs, both of these governorates have registered IPC4 and IPC3 districts as the SAM prevalence rate and SAM caseload in Marib and Al Jawf are 1.5%, 2%, and 4,490, 4,152, respectively. In addition, high numbers of IDPs, returnees, and refugees are registered in the targeted governorates,16,744 IDPs, 2,996 IDPs, Marib and Al Jawf, respectively, which adds to the severity of a need for intervention as the targeted governorates lack food security while the level of severity may differ among them. Taiz have 72 % of their population in need of humanitarian assistance across multiple sectors. Moreover, the largest number of districts that have crossed the critical threshold is located in Taiz governorates, where conflict has been intense, and access has been limited in the last year. The SAM prevalence rate in Taiz is 6.2% of children 6-59 months old, and the SAM caseload for the two governorates is 39,281.
BFD’s intervention will address the lifesaving of those SAM cases with complications by supporting, operationalizing, and monitoring 10 TFCs in the targeted districts while enriching the awareness of the caregivers and PLWs through the activation of 10 IYCF corners. To ensure that CU5 who suffer SAM with complications are provided with the treatment they need by enabling caregivers to give children the right of life.
Yemen: Health Cluster Achievements (Jan – July 2021)
Film (In Arabic): I want to die… One of the tragic stories from the movie Death in Siege Time
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
UNHCR Yemen post cash distribution monitoring – May 2021
As part of UNHCR’s interventions to ensure that extremely vulnerable displaced Yemeni families at risk of famine have the necessary means to buy food and other essential items, in May 2021 alone, UNHCR assisted 53,549 IDP families (some 337,464 individuals) with multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) in 19 governorates, distributing more than USD 10,400,000. This assistance has been made possible through the generous support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates via the Famine Relief Fund, as well as the United States of America and the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Bin Thani Al-Thani Humanitarian Fund.
Most of the beneficiaries in May received a second instalment as part of UNHCR multi-month MPCA programme aiming at providing longer term support with the goal of averting famine and fostering self-reliance
SCAAN Stories: Keeping staff safe in Yemen
Staff security is a key priority as IOM responds to the needs of vulnerable groups including displaced people, conflict affected communities and migrants across Yemen. SCAAN (Security Communications and Analysis Network) is used to enhance situational awareness by providing real-time security alerts to staff about nearby risks and threats.
IOM, in coordination with authorities in Yemen & Ethiopia, successfully transported 115 Ethiopian migrants from Aden to Addis Ababa today in its fourth Voluntary Humanitarian Return flight from Aden this year.
and also http://en.adenpress.news/news/33615
Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period 19 – 26 August 2021
Shelter needs are increasing for newly displaced Yemenis across Marib. Since the beginning of the year, close to 24,000 persons have been uprooted by armed clashes, shelling and air strikes in Marib governorate – a region that is already hosting a quarter of Yemen’s four million internally displaced persons. Most sought safety in urban centres and some 150 informal settlements. A recent UNHCR needs assessment indicates living conditions in settlements remain deplorable, with shelter kits, clean water, latrines, electricity and health facilities in short supply. As women and children constitute 80 per cent of those displaced, they are the ones who suffer most from the ensuing overcrowding, lack of privacy and limited access to basic services. With the support of partner Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS), UNHCR is providing basic household items, legal assistance and psychosocial support across seven settlements in Marib’s Sirwah district, which hosts some 20,000 individuals. Additionally, UNHCR is distributing cash for rent to over 2,800 families, as part cash-based interventions to assist some 6,000 families at risk of eviction.
Thousands of displaced Yemeni families are currently faced with the threat of eviction. During the last week, authorities in Marib shared a list of 2,800 families at risk of eviction from 13 IDP hosting sites on privately-owned land, for which a relocation solution is urgently needed.
Yemen Fact Sheet, August 2021
1,000,000+ IDPs and refugee reached with cash assistance so far in 2021
43,500+ IDP and refugee families have received shelter and NFI kits in 2021
22,000+ IDPs and refugees supported with legal assistance in 2021
25,500+ IDPs and refugees have received psychosocial first aid so far in 2021
Yemen remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. After more than six years of a devastating and unrelenting conflict, some 20 million Yemenis (66 per cent of the total population) depend urgently on humanitarian assistance to survive, including four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 140,146 refugees and asylumseekers, mainly from Somalia and Ethiopia. The country has the fourth largest IDP population due to conflict in the world. Raging clashes continue to deteriorate the protection space for civilians and force thousands of families to seek refuge elsewhere. There are more than 50 active frontlines across the country and more than 50,000 individuals have been forcibly displaced this year, particularly in Marib governorate.
CCCM Cluster Yemen: IDP Hosting Sites Overview (July 2021) – 25 Aug 2021
Film: Imagine you had to leave your home at last minute, walk thru mine contaminated areas and you settle in an IDP site like this one. You lost your job, your home, the ability to feed your family. Then you are evicted and the cycle starts again.
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Shelter needs soar for newly displaced in Yemen’s Marib
This is a summary of what was said by UNHCR spokesperson Aikaterini Kitidi – to whom quoted text may be attributed – at today’s press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
As fighting in Yemen’s Marib governorate forces more people to flee, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is warning of alarming levels of humanitarian needs among displaced communities, including for shelter.
Since the beginning of the year, close to 24,000 people have been uprooted by armed clashes, shelling and air strikes in Marib governorate – a region that is already hosting a quarter of Yemen’s four million internally displaced people. They have sought safety in urban centres and about 150 informal settlements.
A recent UNHCR needs assessment showed that conditions at the settlements are deplorable. They have exceeded capacity, hosting in total nearly 190,000 people.
Women and children constitute 80 per cent of the displaced. With limited shelter options, they are the ones who suffer most from the ensuing overcrowding, lack of privacy and limited access to basic services, such as toilets or water.
With our partners, the Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS), and Human Access, UNHCR is providing basic household items, legal assistance and psychosocial support in seven settlements in Marib’s Sirwah district, hosting some 20,000 people
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IOM Yemen: Situation Report July 2021
In July, clashes continued across Ma’rib, Al Hodeidah and Al Bayda. Hostilities are expected to drive further displacement and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Already, this year, more than 24,500 people have been displaced in Ma’rib – 53 per cent to areas within Sirwah, and 30 per cent to Ma’rib city. Torrential rains, windstorms and flooding hit Ma’rib hard and caused significant infrastructure damage in at least 15 displacement sites.
Highlighting the scale of displacement in Yemen, IOM’s DTM reported that between January and July 2021, nearly 50,000 people have experienced displacement at least once across 13 governorates. In July alone, over 7,500 individuals were displaced, over a third of whom were displaced from Al Bayda to Lahj governorate because of the escalating clashes. Many IDPs have taken shelter in religious sites, schools, and caves in Lahj, while some moved towards Aden in search of humanitarian assistance.
IOM continues to expand its programme on the west coast to meet growing needs of more than 17,000 households residing in 141 displacement sites amid limited partners presence.
IOM estimates that 1,566 migrants entered Yemen in July, compared to 3,545 migrants in June 2021. The drop in numbers may be attributable to the extreme weather conditions.
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp5 – cp19
Vorige / Previous:
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-723 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-756:
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films: