Yemen Press Reader 688: | Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 688 – Yemen War Mosaic 688

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

… Ein gerechtes Ende des Jemenkrieges sichern – Wie der Krieg die Landwirtschaft im Jemen betrifft – Gemeinde-Gesundheitshelfer – Die Emirate im Jemen – Die unendlichen Kriege der USA – Großer Gefangenenaustausch – und mehr

October 21, 2020: Who’s Profiting from the War on Yemen? – Mwatana report: Human rights situation in Yemen 2019 – Yemen Conflict: Key Strategic Transformations – Securing a just end to the Yemen War – How the war affects Yemen’s agriculture – Community Health workers – The Emirates in Yemen – The US endless wars – Great prisoner swap – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Großer Gefangenenaustausch / Most important: Great prisoner swap

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp8a Jamal Khashoggi

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

(B H K)

Film: The #YemenCrisis remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with millions trapped in a cycle of conflict & hunger. How did the situation in #Yemen get so critical?

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H K P)

Who’s Profiting From the War on Yemen?

Q&A with Hassan El-Tayyab

CNL’s Hassan El-Tayyab recently spoke with the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV), a non-profit based out of Iran, to discuss the war in Yemen.

Q: Yemen is one of the most impoverished countries in the world. Some 20 United Nations agencies provide humanitarian, food, educational and relief assistance and implement development programs across the country. Why did the Yemeni civil war, which was a domestic uprising at the outset, take on international dimensions with Saudi Arabia and its allied forces as well as major global powers getting involved in the conflict?

A: […]

The Saudi government was motivated to support reinstalling Hadi to power for many reasons. They were alarmed by the rise of the Houthis at their southern border who they believed to be backed by their main regional competitor, Iran. Additionally, the Bab al-Mandab Strait off the coast of Yemen is a critical oil shipping lane that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This sea route facilitates the movement of millions of barrels of oil per day for Saudi Arabia and is critical to the world’s oil supply. The Yemen war has also served the political ambitions of Mohammad Bin Salman, who has used this conflict to gain national recognition and consolidate power in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi-UAE led coalition’s war on Yemen has received almost unwavering military support and weapons sales from the US, UK, France and other Western countries. At the start of the Yemen war in March 2015, the Obama administration was simultaneously negotiating the JCPOA, also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This diplomatic agreement was largely opposed by Saudi Arabia as they feared the prospect of the US and Iran moving closer together and what that could mean for the US-Saudi alliance and their own regional ambitions. In an attempt to appease Riyadh, the Obama administration accommodated Saudi Arabia’s request for military backing of the coalition’s war on Yemen and agreed to provide targeting assistance and logistical support for coalition airstrikes, midair refueling for Saudi war planes, spare parts transfers, and billions of dollars in weapons sales.

When President Trump took office, the support continued despite the fact that Yemen had become the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis and Congress passed several bipartisan resolutions to end unauthorized military participation and weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The US administration often cites the economic benefits and jobs created from the weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE as justification to keep the US supporting the Yemen war. The war against the Houthis has become a part of Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran and its proxies in the region. Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, have often overplayed the threat of Iran in Yemen as part of a larger regional strategy of keeping the US engaged militarily in the Middle East indefinitely, so they can continue to enjoy the benefits of the US security umbrella.

According to Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, a former Bush administration official, “Saudi Arabia’s rival Iran, too, benefits from the prolonged conflict. Iran has provided some support to the Houthis, but far less than Saudi Arabia and its partners have claimed. Iran seems to see the war as a low-cost way to mire Saudi Arabia and its allies in a quagmire in which each day brings fresh military, financial and reputational costs.”

Q: According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 80 percent of the Yemeni population are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. World Food Program has put the number of food insecure Yemeni citizens at 20 million. While no end is in sight for the conflict, can the international aid organizations be expected to play a determining role in alleviating the suffering of the Yemeni civilians?

A: With news that an urgent UN appeal for assistance to the war-torn country came out over a billion dollar short, alongside a suspension in assistance by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and reports of rapidly increasing cases of the novel coronavirus in Yemen, health experts fear there will be a convergence of crises that completely overwhelm the country and have devastating consequences for the population.

Humanitarian work in Yemen is absolutely critical as 4 million people have been displaced and 80 percent of the country’s 30 million people rely on some form of assistance for survival.

Unfortunately, at a time of untold human suffering, the Trump administration has made drastic cuts to international aid to Yemen, including the suspension of USD73 million in USAID assistance to Houthi-controlled territories in northern Yemen, where currently 80 percent of the population lives.

Q: Since the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen in March 2015, several countries have been selling arms to the Saudis in large proportions, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. Doesn’t this large-scale provision of weaponry to Saudi Arabia to be used in the war on Yemen contradict the human rights obligations of these states?

A: The US State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy policy webpage states, “the protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of US foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

This statement of values by the US government is in direct contradiction with its ongoing military support for the brutal Saudi-led war on Yemen, that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and pushed nearly 14 million Yemenis to the brink of famine. […]. Weapons sales and military support to the war makes these countries complicit in war crimes and is perpetuating the violence by giving Saudi Arabia and the UAE moral cover.

By continuing to give a blank check to the Saudi and UAE-led war on Yemen, coalition partners are eroding their own moral authority and reputation on the world stage, and along with it their ability to credibly engage in meaningful diplomacy to advance human rights and democracy moving forward. =

(** B K P)


In this annual report, Mwatana for Human Rights provides an extensive review of particular violations that occurred and the overall human rights situation in Yemen during 2019. Mwatana, whose work covers all Yemeni governorates except Socotra, has documented—through fact-finding, evidence examination, and detailed research—hundreds of incidents in 2019 alone that appear to violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law, some of which may amount to war crimes. The report presents some incidents as case studies, highlighting different types of abuse committed by the warring parties.

The parties to the conflict in Yemen continued to commit grave violations, undermining Yemenis ability to live, in flagrant disregard of the basic rules of international law and humanitarian standards. The warring parties, including the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and armed groups on the ground, such as the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, have increasingly resorted to bureaucratic measures and other restrictions that have prevented basic items necessary for survival reaching vulnerable groups. Saudi/UAE-led coalition air strikes caused heavy loss of life and damage to vital infrastructure in the country. As documented in this report, ground attacks with indiscriminate and highly inaccurate weapons, like mortars, on populated areas by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, government forces, and armed groups loyal to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition have caused significant material damage and loss of life. The landmines and booby traps left by the Ansar . Allah (Houthi) group have claimed the lives of dozens of civilians, including women and children .

The report includes cases highlighting the harsh conditions of detention, including the atrocious practices of torture and other forms of inhumane treatment, by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, as well as forces affiliated with the Hadi government. Unofficial detention sites and detention centers remain overcrowded, holding both civilian detainees and combatants. As part of efforts aimed at helping reduce the effects of the armed conflict on civilians in Yemen, Mwatana is providing legal follow-up through the Legal Support Unit, staffed by lawyers in the various governorates, which works against the arbitrary approaches adopted by warring parties towards detainees and the disappeared. Legal Support Unit efforts contributed to the release of dozens of detainees.

The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, government forces and armed entities loyal to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition have been recruiting and using children in combat, security and logistical operations. Significantly, this year there was a clear increase in the rate of recruitment and use of girls under the age of 18. In addition, Mwatana found an increase, compared to 2018, in the number of documented sexual violence cases.

The report includes incidents of attacks on hospitals and medical staff. The warring parties bear responsibility for the incessant damage to the already dilapidated medical sector during a time of extremely dangerous humanitarian conditions due to the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). The report also includes documented attacks on schools and educational facilities, including various forms of attack and abuse, such as air and ground strikes, and military occupation and use.

In its annual report, Mwatana has also devoted space to illustrate attacks that affected the rights and civil liberties of Yemenis during 2019. The warring parties continued committing violations against journalists and media professionals. The parties also restricted freedom of movement and subjected civilians to additional arbitrary restrictions that deepened their suffering. The forces of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council resorted to using force to break up peaceful gatherings. Finally, the report sheds light on the human rights situation of the Bahá´í minority in Yemen.

The report consists of three main sections :

Section One: The Yemen Conflict and International Law

International humanitarian law applies to the armed conflict in Yemen. Applicable law includes Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol II of 1977, as well as customary international humanitarian law. International human rights law also continues to apply.15

Section Two: Attacks and Abuses in 2019

This section consists of eleven chapters dealing with the most prominent patterns of international humanitarian law violations committed by the parties to the conflict in Yemen. Additionally, each chapter includes statistics about the number of incidents Mwatana documented during 2019, in addition to a brief legal framework for each pattern of violations and some case studies.

Chapter One: Starvation

In 2019, Mwatana documented at least 112 incidents that again raised concerns regarding the use of starvation as a method of warfare, including attacks impacting objects essential for the survival of the civilian population and warring parties’ repeatedly impeding humanitarian relief, In seventeen Yemeni governorates: Saadah, Al-Bayda, Al-Mahwit, Amanat Al-Asimah, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ibb, Raymah, Al-Hodeidah, Al-Jawf, Amran, Lahj, Marib, Taiz, Shabwah, Aden, and Al-Dhalea. The types of attacks and abuse documented by Mwatana in this chapter included the following: preventing humanitarian aid access, air and ground attacks on means of food production and food distribution such as public markets, farms, livestock, fishing boats, food warehouses and water wells. Additionally, landmines were planted in agricultural fields and valleys, and relief workers were attacked. In these categories, Mwatana documented approximately 74 incidents of denial of humanitarian aid, 15 air strikes, 7 cases of landmines, 4 arbitrary arrest of 5 relief workers and 12 cases of indiscriminate ground shelling. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group bears responsibility for 81 of these incidents. Saudi/UAE-led coalition forces committed 15 incidents. Saudi ground forces were responsible for 7 incidents and government forces for 4 incidents. The UEA-loyal Joint Forces brigades bore responsibility for two incidents. The Southern Transitional Council bore responsibility for one incident. The Ansar Allah «Houthis» and the forces of the UAE-backed Transitional Council bear joint responsibility in one incident, and Mwatana was unable to determine the perpetrator in one incident.

Chapter Two: Air Strikes

In 2019, Mwatana documented at least 64 air strikes launched by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition impacting civilians and civilian objects in ten Yemeni governorates: Amanat Al-Asemah, Hajjah, Sa’dah, ‘Amran, Al-Hudaydah, Dhamar, Taiz, Al Dhalea, Al Bayda, and Abyan. At least 293 civilians were killed, including 95 children and 54 women, and at least 380 civilians were injured, including 111 children and 57 women, in these attacks. These attacks damaged and destroyed protected civilian objects, and hit residential homes and neighborhoods, detention centers, markets, bridges, schools, and service and commercial facilities.

Chapter Three: Ground Attacks

In 2019, Mwatana documented approximately 124 ground attacks that killed 132 civilians, including 27 women and 73 children, and wounded at least 329 civilians, including 57 women and 202 children. These incidents were distributed in the governorates of Ma’rib, Lahj, Aden, Sa’dah, Hajjah, Taiz, Al Dhalea, Al-Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Abyan and Ibb. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group bears responsibility for 67 attacks. Saudi ground forces were responsible for 11 incidents. government forces 15 attacks, UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council Security Belt forces 14 attacks, UAE-backed Joint Forces in the West Coast committed two ground attacks. Meanwhile, the Ansar Allah (Houthis) group and government forces bear the joint responsibility for 11 incidents. And the joint responsibility in one incident falls on Saudi ground forces and government forces. Mwatana was not able to determine the party responsible in 3 other attacks.

Chapter Four: Landmines

In 2019, Mwatana documented nearly 46 incidents of landmine explosions, killing 23 civilians, including 12 children and 4 women, and wounding 60 civilians, including 31 children and 8 women. These incidents were concentrated in the governorates of Al-Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Lahj, Shabwah, Hajjah, Taiz, Sa’dah, Al Dhalea and Al Bayda. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group planted these mines.

Chapter Five: Recruitment and Use of Children

During 2019, Mwatana verified the recruitment and use of at least 602 children, including at least 43 girls. Through 317 testimonies and interviews conducted by the organization, Mwatana found that the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group recruited 75% of these children, concentrated in the governorates of Sa’dah, Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, Al Jawf and Sana’a. The percentage of children recruited by the forces loyal to President Hadi was approximately 18% of the total, in the governorates of Ma’rib, Taiz, Shabwah and Al Jawf. The percentage of children recruited by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces was 6% of the sample, concentrated in the governorates of Abyan, Lahj, Aden and Hadhramaut. The joint forces in the West Coast, backed by the UAE, are responsible for recruiting 1%.

Chapter Six: Arbitrary Detention

In 2019, Mwatana documented 210 cases of arbitrary detention of 265 victims, including 18 children. Parties to the conflict arbitrarily detained civilians in 21 Yemeni governorates, all of which are covered by Mwatana. In the governorates it controls, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group committed 125 arbitrary detentions. Mwatana documented 56 arbitrary detentions carried out by government forces, and 24 cases of arbitrary detention by UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces in the governorates under its control. The Joint Forces backed by UAE were responsible for one case, while Saudi/UAE-led coalition forces carried .

out two of the documented arbitrary detentions. Mwatana also documented two cases of arbitrary detention and torture carried out by gangs engaged in human trafficking in Ras al-Ara region in Lahj governorate. The documented cases of arbitrary detention in 2019 also included the detention of 8 women.

Chapter Seven: Enforced Disappearance

In 2019, Mwatana documented 39 incidents of enforced disappearance of 44 victims, including one child in the Yemeni governorates of Hadramout, Saadah, Hajjah, Al-Jawf, Amanat Al-Asimah, Ma’rib, Aden, Dhamar, Taiz, Al-Mahra, Al-Mahwit, Al-Dhalea, Al-Hodeidah, Al-Bayda, and Ibb. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group bears responsibility for 28 of these enforced disappearances. Government forces bear responsibility for 5, while UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces were responsible for 6 cases of enforced disappearance of civilians.

Chapter Eight: Torture

In 2019, Mwatana documented 8 incidents of torture. Four of these cases were committed by the UAE-backed Security Belt forces in Abyan governorate, including two deaths in detention. Four cases were carried out by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group in the governorates of Taiz, Amanat Al-Asemah and Hajjah, including three deaths in detention.

Chapter Nine: Sexual Violence

In 2019, Mwatana documented 12 cases of sexual violence. Those subjected to sexual violence included 11 children and a woman. Documented cases of rape included seven girls aged 5, 8, 11, 12 and 13 years old, two girls aged 16 years old, and two boys aged 8 and 13 years old. Mwatana documented a 14 and 16-year-old boy and a 30-year-old woman subjected to other forms of sexual assault. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group are responsible for ten of these incidents. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces are responsible for two of the documented incidents of sexual violence. Most of those subjected to sexual violence lived in dangerous environments where they were exposed to a variety of violations, and were already vulnerable, as members of a marginalized group, working children, displaced people, or those with special needs.

Chapter Ten: Attacks on Schools

In 2019, Mwatana documented at least 56 incidents of attacks on or military use of schools. These cases included three Saudi/UAE-led coalition air strikes in Al Dhalea and Sa’dah governorates and three indiscriminate ground attacks in Sa’dah and Taiz governorates with government forces responsible for an one of the ground attacks, on a school where the Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces were stationed, and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group responsible for two of the ground attacks, impacting schools in Taiz governorate. Mwatana documented 36 incidents of the use of schools for military purposes, with the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group responsible for 35 incidents in the governorates of Al Mahwit, Raymah, Sa’dah, Dhamar, and Ibb, and government forces responsible for one in the governorate of Taiz. Mwatana also documented 11 incidents of school occupation, 7 by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group in Sa’dah Governorate, 2 by the Security Belt forces in Abyan governorate, and 2 by government forces. In an investigation conducted in partnership with Human Rights Watch, Mwatana also documented three other attacks impacting schools, including an explosion in a warehouse containing a large amount of volatile substances stored by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group near three schools in the residential neighborhood of Sa’wan in Amanat Al-Asemah. The explosion killed 15 children and injured dozens.

Chapter Eleven: Attacks on Health Care

Throughout 2019, Mwatana documented 19 cases of various types attacks on hospitals, health centers and medical staff. Medical objects were subjected to armed intrusion, medical teams were attacked with live ammunition, and humanitarian and medical aid was obstructed. During these attacks, 4 people were killed, including a health worker and a doctor’s assistant, and 4 were wounded, including a health worker. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group committed 6 of the violations documented by Mwatana in the governorates of Taiz, Sa’dah, Raymah, Ibb and Al Dhalea. Government forces were responsible for 12 of the cases, in Taiz and Ma’rib. And one incident was committed by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition.

Section Three: Undermining Rights and Freedoms

This section contains four chapters dealing with violations of international human rights law committed by the parties to the conflict in Yemen

Chapter One: The Press

In 2019, Mwatana documented 10 cases of abuse against the press, involving 13 journalists and media professionals. Seven cases were committed by security and military forces affiliated with President Hadi, while the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group arbitrarily arrested a journalist and forcibly disappeared another. A Saudi/UAE-led coalition air strike hit the home of journalist Abdallah Sabri.

Chapter Two: Freedom of Movement

In 2019, Mwatana documented 29 cases impeding freedom of movement in different Yemeni regions. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group is responsible for 17 cases, government forces and affiliated groups for 8, and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council for three. The joint responsibility falls on Ansar Allah (Houthis) group and government forces in one incident.

Chapter Three: Peaceful Assembly

Mwatana documented two incidents of UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces cracking down on peaceful gatherings and demonstrations by Yemeni citizens in Abyan and Hadhramaut.

Chapter Four: Religious Minorities

This chapter highlights the human rights situation of the Bahá´í minority community in Yemen.

and also

(** B K P)

Yemen Conflict: Key Strategic Transformations

from Foreword

For more than six years, Yemen has been a battlefield for an aggressive war that left the country on the brink of starvation and sent it 30 years back. However, as time passed, the course of war witnessed many turning points that changed the compass of the warring parties dramatically. The announced agenda of “Operation Decisive Storm,” launched in March 2015 to defeat the Houthi coup and restore the “Legitimacy” has not been fulfilled. Instead, we have witnessed new military fronts emerge in the South and East of the country, areas that are far away from the supposed enemy, the Houthis.

Unfortunately, the war in Yemen does not get the attention that it deserves, and world media does not provide sufficient coverage for “the world’s worst man-made humanitarian crisis since World War II.” In this context, Washington Center for Yemeni Studies (WCYS) produces its first book to highlight the main and strategic changes in the course of war in Yemen. This book, The Compass of the Conflict in Yemen: Key Strategic Transformations, was originally written in Arabic and addressed the Arabic readership. It records the significant developments in different military, political, economic and humanitarian aspects of the war between 2017 and 2019.

from Forecast

The main determinant of possible developments in the near future is based on the key developments in Yemen in recent years, starting from the Houthis’ seizure of power, Saudi military intervention, the deviation of the Emirati role from the declared objectives of the intervention, and the resulting political, economic, military, and humanitarian conditions. The factors that would have the most influence in determining the course of the war in Yemen in the near future are based onthe will and decisions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the reaction of the United Arab Emirates, and the regional developments. Examining the different possible scenarios, there are three main possible courses for the Yemeni crisis in the near future – by Ateq Garallah =

My comment: A book on the Yemen War, Backgrounds and Perspectives. The author seems to be supportive to the Hadii gocvernment, against Houthis, UAE and separatists. Thus, aseparatist supporter critizes this:

The book reflects the author’s political view rather than being neutral in surveying the conflict. The auther has totally ignored the Southern Issue and the main reason for the violent war in the South that forced Huthies to leave these governorate as well as the current conflict between Southern resistance forces and Islah party forces backed by Yemen government and Qatar – Turkish alliance.

(** B P)


If moments of transition are ruptures where old ideas and institutions are radically reconsidered, there is misplaced faith in the assumption that such ruptures lead only or directly toward democratic or liberal ends. Indeed, both 1994 and the period between 2012 and 2014 represent moments in which transitional justice was never seriously or credibly pursued by those with the power to implement democratic reforms, but was instead used to consolidate unaccountable power in ways that fueled further conflict. By dismissing or subverting demands for justice, decision makers during both periods contributed to the very violence and social disorder to which they claimed to be responding.

The fears of civil war and deterioration that drove Yemenis to accept a flawed agreement in 2011 have long since come to fruition, with Yemen in dire need of an agreement to end the punishing conflict and to address the humanitarian crisis generated by it. Precedents from past conflict in Yemen show that an end to fighting is in itself insufficient to address citizens’ demands for accountable governance. Instead, decision makers need to more genuinely consider what role justice can or should play in supporting an alternative to the unremitting suffering of the past five (or thirty-five) years and in building a better future.

The hard work of marrying peacebuilding and transitional justice will not be advanced through international criminal prosecutions by the ICC, though the threat of individual liability may motivate war’s antagonists to work harder for peace. Retributive justice of the sort sought through the ICC is also not particularly effective in promoting reconciliation, social cohesion, or requisites of sustainable peace. As the scholar Nevin Aiken has argued, post-conflict reconciliation requires “social learning” that allows former antagonists to develop mutual trust, but such learning is predicated on addressing structural and material conditions. Institutions of transitional justice can (but do not by definition) provide generative opportunities to address the structural sources of conflict and thereby enable social (re)learning.

The good news is that some social (re)learning is already underway in Yemen. Non-combatant actors excluded from formal negotiations have nonetheless been engaged in the difficult work of civil action, whereby they work with diverse others to meet community needs in a way that constitutes a kind of everyday peacebuilding. As research teams at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient and other organizations are increasingly documenting, Yemenis are undertaking such work in the face of demanding conditions, both in coordination with a range of local authorities and independently. Individuals and organizations are reaching across sectarian, tribal, generational, and other lines.

Through these endeavors, Yemenis are already doing some of the work that non-judicial institutions of transitional justice often provide after wars end, creating opportunities to repair relationships torn by conflict and furthering the process of relearning that contributes to social cohesion. The challenge now is to recognize such efforts—as well as the work of Yemenis documenting and amplifying it—as a substantive component of peacebuilding and to better align formal diplomatic approaches with them.

Rather than viewing an internationally brokered process as “bringing” peace and peace-supporting institutions to Yemen, peace brokers should learn from, support, and scale up existing peacebuilding practices. This would be consistent with a victim-centered approach to transitional justice, expanding the agency of all who have suffered in the civil war. Such an approach would take a cue from Yemenis themselves, for whom #YemenCantWait is not a media strategy, but a lived reality – by Stacey Philbrick Yadav

(** B K P)


There’s renewed hope for future compromise between Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG) and the Houthis following the warring parties’ agreement last month to exchange prisoners. But, arriving at this promising trust-building measure has been very difficult, and more needs to change if the country is to achieve further progress on a path to reconciliation.

Over the course of five years, the warring parties have disbanded into numerous factions, and the war has fractured into multiple–almost independent–conflicts. Each of these separate fronts comes with a different set of leaders with their own fears and interests. These unique and shifting dynamics also require a tailored approach to peace building because of the spectrum of opinions about what that should look like. Sometimes the various party leaders see their situation in the war clearly and make decisions grounded in rationale, and other times, they are hindered by wishful thinking.

As long as the warring parties continue to benefit from the conflict more than from compromise, they will not agree to a meaningful peace deal. This aspect of the conflict is entrenching “winner takes all” mindsets. Unless the wars’ leaders abandon this zero-sum game approach, peace in Yemen will remain out of reach. This idea is explored further below.

After five years of war, the Houthis have transformed from an armed sociopolitical movement into a commanding military force, operating a coercive authority in territories under its control in north-western Yemen. The group currently controls the capital Sana’a, one-third of the country’s land, two-thirds of its population and almost all of the former central state’s weaponry and institutions. The group has developed a repressive, vice grip on the populace and silences dissent. As a result, the Houthis fear that a peace agreement involving a power sharing arrangement would invite a “Trojan Horse” into Sana’a, where the group currently enjoys security and military hegemony.

As the Houthis have consolidated control over northern Yemen, the IRG’s domestic influence and legitimacy has eroded. It currently maintains little more than a fragile, symbolic political presence in Yemen. The longer the IRG remains outside the country, the harder it will become for them to create a transitional government, which is a precursor to its ability to re-establish power in Sana’a. But given the IRG’s exile in Riyadh, where many members enjoy lavish lifestyles funded by Saudi Arabia, there’s a lack of incentive for these leaders to return to a country where any sort of peace agreement would likely mean they’d have to share power with their archenemy. Because of the Houthis’ military strength on the ground, the IRG fears the group has the means to abandon a potential power-sharing agreement in order to cement itself as a dominant political force, similar to how Hezbollah has wielded power in Lebanon.

Like the IRG, another major political player in the conflict, the Islah Party, which is a blend of Muslim Brotherhood and tribal loyalists, has not shown much interest in reaching a peace agreement.

Throughout the ongoing peace negotiations, the IRG has also insisted on the implementation of UN Resolution 2216. Its full implementation would guarantee that the IRG emerges from the war as the “winner” because the resolution calls for the complete disarmament and withdrawal of the Houthis and the restoration of the “legitimate government” in the capital. This would guarantee the IRG receives the entire metaphorical “cake.” All other parties would have to accept a limited role in a renewed national partnership, turn over their heavy weaponry and relinquish territorial gains without any compensatory measures. Large questions remain about the practicality of the resolution.

Some international experts argue the resolution doesn’t reflect the situation’s complexity. The war is not just a two-party conflict as it’s depicted in the resolution. But as long as the UN’s special envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, uses the resolution as the basis for peace talks, the IRG will not abandon its position. Government leaders see the resolution as their only real option to make a safe return to Yemen because of their dwindling in-country influence and eroding legitimacy. The government’s support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is also on the decline.

The Houthis, on the other hand, are not interested in a peace agreement as long as the group has the opportunity to make more territorial gains. In short, the longer a peace agreement is postponed, the greater territorial control the Houthis will have.

The Houthis prefer a military victory over political dialogue. The group hopes a takeover in Marib could tip the scales in their favor at the UN-led talks.

The STC sees itself as the potential governing body for a future independent state in Yemen’s southern governorates. The group has slowly started building its military power with support from the UAE because of unsuccessful bids for recognition from the wider international community.

Implementing the Riyadh Agreement would force the STC to relinquish its political and military standing, as well as its bid for an independent state. The IRG would be free to return to the South and re-establish its military and political dominance. As long as the UAE supports its presence, the STC will continue to hold off on seriously accepting the terms of the agreement.

As the war in Yemen continues to fragment into a variety of fronts with multiple actors, a negotiated country-wide peace agreement is more difficult than ever. A number of things listed below would need to change so the warring parties are incentivized to move towards a compromise.

On the international level: The framework for the UN-led peace talks need to move away from UN Resolution 2216, which promotes a “winner takes all” strategy. This issue could be, at least partially, resolved by inviting more than two parties to the negotiating table and pressuring the Houthis to stop its military advancements. This represents a similar tactic the UN has already used. International negotiators convinced the Saudi-led coalition to pull back as they advanced up the western coast of Hodeidah in 2018.

On the regional level: Political and material support for the warring parties coming from regional actors—namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran—should not encourage a zero-sum game, but should instead motivate in-country leadership to compromise. This requires high-level negotiations between these external and powerful countries pushing them to find a regional approach that results in more inclusive dialogue.

On the local level: The warring parties in Yemen need to build trust between them and begin to make compromises – by Hussein Alwaday

My comment: I think the author forgets to deal with foreign forces which also keep the Yemen War going and are not interested in ending the war, in contrast to their own lip services: US geopolitics is focussed on securing US supremacy in the Gulf region by pampering and supporting the Saudis and the UAE and by confronting iran (and the US leadership is so much focussed on Iran that they really believe they could do this by keeping the Yemen War going). And, the US and UK and other Western arms sellers are making billions by flooding the Yemen thatre of war with continually growing bulks of arms.

(** B H K)

Yemen’s agriculture in distress: A case study of wadis Zabid and Rima, the Tihamah

In our analysis of the condition of Yemen’s agricultural areas, one area stood out as particularly impacted – wadis Zabid and Rima in the Tihamah ‘breadbasket’. Traditionally this area has grown a great diversity of fruits, vegetables, cereals, fodder crops and cash crops – such as cotton and henna. Rainfall along the coastal plains is scarce and, although farms in the foothills can access spate water, the majority of farms in the down and mid-stream areas are reliant on groundwater – especially for water-intensive fruit crops.

Using open-source datasets, Eoghan Darbyshire takes a deep dive into the situation that has unfolded in this area, and analyses the complex relationship between the conflict and the deteriorating agricultural situation.

In total 46% of the cropland area in wadis Zabid and Rima is in distress, equivalent to 751km2. This is based on our agricultural distress index, which captures where there have been significant biomass losses between the pre-conflict period (2009-2013), and the period during the conflict (2014-2019). The index incorporates changes in both total-biomass and relative-biomass, which accounts for inter-annual variability in the weather, as well as where the discrepancy between the two is particularly large. The total-biomass losses in and around the wadis have been in the down- and mid-stream areas, whilst relative biomass losses are throughout the region of study, including the up-stream areas.

At this more local scale, it is easier to bring in supplementary higher resolution data products to validate our agricultural distress index and open source reporting. For example, the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) allows us to show the individual farms that have experienced the greatest changes. Although a very different measurement type,1 and comparing over a slightly different period, Fig. 3 shows a broad agreement between the SAR and total-biomass changes pre to during-conflict.

To show these changes more tangibly, we have compiled before and after high resolution imagery from three of the worst affected areas. To ensure the changes are simply not from harvesting practises we compare historical imagery from the same time of year – autumn. 2

The first case is a relatively large farm in downstream Wadi Rima, which from the regimented layout and circular crowns we can deduce is an orchard – likely mangos, bananas or dates. Nearly all of its fields are barren by 2018. Zooming in there are darker patches where the trunks would be – likely to be bare dead trunks. We have been unable to find much information about the farm, other than a 2007 entry on Wikimapia, which lists it as (translated): The farm of the late Mohamed Ahmed Al-Ansi. Given the scale of the farm, it is possible it belongs to a land-owner and was farmed by tenants. Intriguingly, in the most recent imagery from September 2019 (not shown) there are some signs of recovery in the vicinity, including the installation of solar panels, presumably to abstract groundwater. Indeed, a search of YouTube videos geotagged near the farm shows solar powered irrigation – whilst this may not be the farm in question, it suggests that there is renewed investment in at least some agriculture in the wadi.

The next case are the smaller farms surrounding the town of Zabid, likely growing cotton, cereal or vegetables. Again, by 2017 many of these fields lay empty – and in stark contrast to those that have retained some crops. The fields in the north of the frame show visible ingress of sand-dunes, indicating desertification.

Finally, a case where natural vegetation 3 has been converted to cropland, presumably to make use of the fresh water resource supporting the vegetation. Furthermore, the felled vegetation will have acted as a valuable fuel source, with firewood use increasing by approximately a third in Wadi Zabid.

This area doesn’t appear in the ‘agriculture in distress’ index, as it is occurring on natural vegetation. However, it is perhaps indicative of the pressures on agriculture in the wider area to expand into areas with fresh water – presumably by a finite amount before salt water ingress occurs to the shallower coastal aquifer. This is a fate that has previously afflicted the date palm area of Al-Mujellis, just to the south, and is currently affecting the Al-Jah region to the north.

In spite of searches for geolocated tweets, photos and articles, very little detailed information could be found on these case study sites – partially because the use of social media is not as widespread, nor on the same platforms, as in other locations. This shows that for Yemen, to get hyper-local information it is necessary to use local sources. Indeed, our remote-sensing based perspectives are corroborated by reports from on the ground. Agricultural losses in Wadi Zabid were identified previously in a 2017 analysis by the Flood-Based Livelihoods Network Foundation (FBLNF). This study conducted household surveys and determined that the conflict had reduced yields of sesame, cotton and tobacco by 59%, vegetables by 53% and fruits by 44%. The study also estimated the area under cultivation to have fallen by 51%.

These findings are in good agreement with official figures from the Ministry of Agriculture (MAI) for Hodeidah governorate as a whole, which also show a drop in production and the area under cultivation, particularly of cereals and vegetables. Curiously, these same official statistics show a huge improvement in 2019 compared to 2018. We treat this increase with some scepticism, as although there was an increase in biomass as seen from space in 2019, the scales are not consistent. The MAI is based in Sana’a and under Houthi control, and therefore liable to political manipulation; this may not be the case here, but such a risk is one of the problems of using data from conflict parties (with photos and infographics)

(** B H)

Community Health Workers Are Yemen’s Superheroes

To help Yemen’s most vulnerable children, UNICEF and the European Union are supporting The Community Health Worker Project, which trains community health workers to provide children in hard-to-reach areas with the health and nutrition services they need to survive and thrive.

The project recruits women like Fatima Khatem (above left), who works as a community health worker in the Hamadan District of Yemen’s Sana’a Governate. „I feel proud of what I do in providing health services to children and women in the community and in the internally displaced person camp in Dharawan Area,“ she says. „The services that I provide to the local community and to the displaced in Dharawan Camp include awareness-raising and sensitization and child and prenatal care.“

In Manakhah District, also in Sana’a Governate, community health worker Hajar Al-Jidawi (below) started delivering door-to-door services after completing a UNICEF-supported training program. Hajar lives in the village of Jidaw (above), three hours away from the district center. She loves making house calls, even though it means navigating steep and rocky terrain every day. She conducts malnutrition and health screenings and promotes community awareness about the importance of hygiene and disease prevention.

According to the CHW Project officer in Sana’a’s Manakhah District, Mohammed Thabet, „The health workers provide services to their communities after receiving theoretical and practical training in nutrition, reproductive health, child care and first aid.“ Thabet stresses the importance of the role of female health workers in reaching people who are unable to access health facilities and benefit from their provided services.

According to Amal Al-Shawish, a 28-year-old mother of four in the village of Dhayan in Amran Governate, „Basma, the community health worker in my village, saved me from death due to complications during pregnancy and childbirth.“

„The CHW Project aims to train female health workers from the targeted areas in child care, awareness-raising and sensitization, reproductive health, and providing immunization and nutrition services for children,“ reports Dr. Abdul-Alim Al-Tha’wani, coordinator of the Community Health Worker (CHW) Project at the Health Office in Yemen’s Amran Governorate.

UNICEF is working through the CHW Project to maintain the country’s health system in order to ensure better health care for every child. It also continues to support the expansion of primary health care services for children and women in Yemen, as well as regular outreach services for local communities.

(** B P)

Divide and rule: How the UAE is wreaking havoc in war-torn Yemen

The Emiratis view the south as an outpost to exert control over the Gulf and Iran, and now they are inviting the Israelis in.

The UAE, where Abu Dhabi and Dubai have been the dominant powers at the expense of the other smaller Emirates, has pursued an aggressive foreign policy across the turbulent Middle East to stop assertive political groups espousing democratic governance.

More than anywhere else, in southern Yemen, the UAE’s anti-democratic policies have been executed by its brutal militias and mercenaries.

In south Yemen, the Emirates supports separatists organised under the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which fights not only with the Yemeni government but also against the Houthis backed by Iran.

By supporting the STC, the UAE aims to control a U-shaped area from the Red Sea to the Gulf across the Indian Ocean, seeking to secure an alternative shipping route in case Iran, Abu Dhabi’s enemy, blocks the Gulf from hostile forces amid escalating tensions.

The UAE also wants to limit the reach of the powerful Houthis across Yemen and its shores.

Through its paramilitary forces, during the civil war, the UAE has been able to control strategic coastal points, which host important ports like Balhaf and Nishtun near the Red Sea, in southern Yemen. Abu Dhabi also wields considerable influence across Yemen’s western shores.

With the normalisation deal between the UAE and Israel, Abu Dhabi has appeared to bring its Zionist ally into the region, allowing it to establish spy bases across South Yemen and a strategic island, Socotra, in the Indian Ocean.

Like the UAE, a divided Yemen would benefit Israel. While the United Arab Emirates, through the separatist STC, could project its power across the war-torn country and the region, the Israelis could use another weakened Arab country to flex its foreign policy.

Israel can also easily observe and check Iranian movements across the Indian Ocean and the Gulf from the U-shaped region.

Both the UAE and Israel have prominent common objectives across Yemen other than just cornering Iran. One of those objectives is their resistance against the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements across the Middle East.

Both countries have supported anti-Brotherhood politics from Egypt and Libya to the Gulf and Yemen, where the Islah Party has close connections with the religiously-inspired movement.

“The UAE fears, in particular, the Brotherhood’s alternative blueprint for state power derived from political Islam and the challenge it poses to hereditary monarchies,” wrote Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and a nonresident fellow at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

“In Yemen, this has translated into systematic efforts to weaken Islah, roughly the Yemeni branch of the Brotherhood and a key partner of the [President Abdrabbuh Mansur] Hadi government,” Juneau maintained.

UAE’s Brotherhood “fears” also partly explain why the autocratic Gulf country supports the STC, a political alliance of southern secessionists.

“This is not out of sympathy for their aspirations but, instead, is the product of necessity: Southern groups are opposed to Islah, for historical reasons, making them natural partners,” the professor pointed out. “Geography also brings them together, since the UAE seeks a presence on the southern coast.”

The STC is not the only ally of the UAE in Yemen.

“The UAE, in particular, has supported—directly and indirectly—a range of groups and militias, including Salafists with ties to AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula],” Juneau indicated.

But the UAE support to groups with links to Al Qaeda has failed to raise official eyebrows in Washington as of yet.

Brotherhood fears also motivated the Gulf monarchy to back Tariq Saleh, a nephew of former Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who leads forces previously loyal to his late uncle.

My comment: Keep in mind that this is an article from Turkey – and Turkey is a foe to the UAE and is sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood and Yemeni Islah Party.

und eine deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung:

(*B P)

Teile und herrsche: Wie die Emirate den Jemen destabilisieren

Die VAE destabilisieren mit Hilfe des sogenannten Südübergangsrats im Südjemen das durch den Bürgerkrieg zerrüttete Land. Ziel ist es, den eigenen Einfluss auszubauen und den Iran zurückzudrängen. Dafür kooperiert die Monarchie mit Israel.

Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) betrachten den Süden Jemens als ihren Vorposten, um die Kontrolle über die Gewässer in der Region zu gewinnen und den Iran zeitgleich zurückzudrängen. Dafür kooperieren die Monarchen am Persischen Golf mit Israel.
Die VAE verfolgen im Nahen Osten eine aggressive Außenpolitik. Mehr als anderswo wurde die antidemokratische Politik der Emirate im Südjemen mit Hilfe von brutalen Milizen und Söldnern durchgesetzt. Ziel der autokratischen Monarchie ist es, politische Gruppen, die ein demokratisches Regierungssystem in der Region befürworten, mit allen Mitteln zu bekämpfen.
Im Südjemen unterstützen die Emirate daher Separatisten, die im Rahmen des sogenannten Südübergangsrats organisiert sind.

Der Rat befindet sich in einem ständigen Konfrontationskurs mit der international anerkannten jemenitischen Regierung sowie den vom Iran unterstützten Huthi-Rebellen, die die Hauptstadt Sanaa kontrollieren.

Durch die Unterstützung des Südübergangsrats wollen die VAE die Kontrolle über ein U-förmiges Gebiet erlangen, das das Rote Meer, den Golf von Aden sowie den Indischen Ozean überblickt. Die Emirate beabsichtigen zudem, eine alternative Schifffahrtsroute zu sichern, falls der Iran den Golf blockieren sollte.
Die VAE versuchen zudem, den Einfluss der Huthis im Jemen zu begrenzen.

Durch das Normalisierungsabkommen mit Israel scheinen die VAE nun auch ihren neuen Verbündeten in die Region einzubringen. So wurden bereits Spionagebasen im Südjemen und auf der strategisch wichtigen Insel Sokotra im Indischen Ozean errichtet. Sowohl den Emiraten als auch Israel würde ein gespaltenes Jemen geopolitisch zugutekommen.

Mein Kommentar: Aus der Türkei, die mit den Emiraten in geostrategischer Konkurrenz im arabischen Raum (und auch im Jemen) steht.

(** B K P)

The US Chose Endless War Over Pandemic Preparedness. Now We See the Effects.

Spending trillions on the annual military budget has stolen money that could have been used for pandemic preparedness.

In this exclusive Truthout interview, David Vine, a professor of anthropology at American University in Washington, D.C., addresses critical questions about U.S. war culture and Trump’s own contribution to the violence that has always been foundational to U.S. culture.

Vine: According to my research, the U.S. military has been at war or engaged in other combat in all but 11 years of U.S. history — 95 percent of the years the United States has existed. My book shows how the huge collection of U.S. military bases abroad provides a key — or a kind of lens — to help understand why the United States has been fighting almost without pause since 1776. Bases abroad, bases beyond U.S. borders show how U.S. political, economic and military leaders — shaped by the forces of history, capitalism, racism, patriarchy, nationalism and religion — have used taxpayer money to build a self-perpetuating system of permanent, imperialist war revolving around an often-expanding collection of extraterritorial military bases. These bases have expanded the boundaries of the United States, while keeping the country locked in a state of nearly continuous war that has largely served the economic and political interests of elites and left tens of millions dead, wounded and displaced.

To be clear, my argument is not that U.S. bases abroad are the singular cause of this near-endless fighting. Indeed, my book shows how the answer to why the U.S. government has fought so constantly lies in the capitalist profit-making desires of businesses and elites, in the electoral interests of politicians, and in the forces of racism, militarized masculinity, nationalism and missionary Christianity, among other dynamics.

U.S. bases abroad, however, have played a key and long overlooked role in the pattern of near-constant U.S. fighting: that is, since independence, bases that U.S. leaders have built beyond the borders of the United States not only have enabled wars but also have made offensive imperialist wars more likely. While U.S. leaders often portray bases abroad as defensive in nature, the opposite is generally the case: bases built on the territory of other peoples have tended to be offensive in nature, providing a launchpad for yet more wars. This has tended to create a pattern in which bases abroad have led to wars that have led to the construction of new bases abroad that have led to new wars that have led to new bases and so on.

Alongside the human damage, the financial costs of the so-called war on terror are so large, they’re nearly incomprehensible. As of October 2020, the U.S. government has spent or obligated a minimum of $6.4 trillion on the post-2001 wars, including the costs of future veterans’ benefits and interest payments on the money borrowed to pay for the wars. The actual costs are likely to run hundreds of billions or trillions more, depending on when we force our politicians to bring these seemingly endless wars to an end.

While it’s incredibly hard to fathom $6.4 trillion in taxpayer funds vanished, the catastrophe is compounded when we consider how else the U.S. government could have spent such incredible sums of money. What could these trillions have done to provide universal health care, to rebuild public schools, to build affordable housing, to end homelessness and hunger, to rebuild crumbling civilian infrastructure, to prepare for pandemics? In addition to the 3-4 million who have likely died in the wars the U.S. government has fought since 2001, how many more have died because of the investments the U.S. government did not make? These are questions that, I have to say, should make us weep.

In trying to wrap our minds around the unbelievable human and financial costs of the so-called “war on terror,” we also have to remember that this war has also been a catastrophic failure on its own terms: the main result of the “war on terror” has been to spread terror and dramatically expand the number of groups and people who would engage in terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens and others civilians worldwide as a political tool.

In short, I would say the United States has always been a profoundly violent country, but that often this violence has been obscured or ignored, at least by some. In this way, just as Trump’s reign has exposed the racism, nativism and misogyny of the United States, Trump has also exposed the violence that has always been foundational — but not inevitable — to the United States.

We can also see the connections between today’s violence and the history of U.S. wars in the massive number of guns and other firearms in the United States, in the longstanding glorification of war and violence in U.S. popular culture, and in the growing militarization of the police, among many other connections.

Clearly there is a deep connection between the war machine and the U.S. government’s failure to protect the country against COVID. Trump is responsible for the unnecessary deaths of at least tens of thousands of people, but the responsibility is shared by past presidential administrations and the entire war system. As others have pointed out, spending $6.4 trillion on the “war on terror” and trillions more on the annual military budget since 2001 has not protected us from COVID and other pandemics. Spending such immense sums on war has stolen money — and the time and energies of millions of Americans — from pandemic preparedness, from a properly robust public health infrastructure, and from the creation of a universal health care system that could have properly cared for the sick.

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

One new case of coronavirus reported, 2,057 in total

(B H)

„Window Talks“ öffnet Fenster in fremde Welten

Der Doku-Blog zeigt aus persönlichen Blickwinkeln, wie Menschen in verschiedenen Ländern mit der Pandemie leben.

Layan ist 16 und lebt in Sana’a im Jemen. Eigentlich geht sie zur Schule und arbeitet ehrenamtlich in einer Hilfsorganisation, doch seit einigen Monaten hat beides wegen der Corona-Pandemie geschlossen. „Ich bin traurig über mein Leben. Es ist nicht das Leben, das ich mir vorgestellt hatte. Ich wollte, dass wir in Sicherheit sind und träumte von einer guten Ausbildung an einer guten Universität“, sagt sie im Interview auf dem Blog „Window Talks“. Sie erzählt dort vom Versagen des Gesundheitsministeriums in ihrer Heimat und ihren Nachbarn, die an Covid-19 gestorben sind, von der prekären Sicherheitslage im Jemen und von ihrer Leidenschaft für das Singen und Tanzen. Die Geschichte der jungen Layan habe viele Menschen berührt, sagt Helene Aecherli.!amp

(A H)

Neither new cases of COVID-19, deaths nor recovery recorded
(A H)

One new case of coronavirus reported in al-Mahra

(A H)

No cases of COVID-19 nor death, 1 recovery reported in Lahj

(A H)

2 new cases of coronavirus reported, 2,055 in total

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Großer Gefangenenaustausch / Most important: Great prisoner swap

(A P)

The president of the Association of Abductees‘ Mothers, Amat Al-Salam Al-Haj, criticized the prisoners‘ exchange agreement with the Houthi group for not including female detainees and abductees.

(A P)

Journalists released from Houthi prisons suffer a critical medical condition as a result of torture

The five journalists, released from Houthi militia prisons, in the last exchange deal last week, are suffering from poor health, as a result of torture and enforced disappearance for more than five years. The five journalists apologized for speaking to the media, and said that they are currently focusing on conducting initial medical examinations to determine the medical interventions they need.

(* A P)

«Viele wussten nicht, was Covid-19 ist»

Drei Mal ist er gescheitert, nun ist es in Jemen vergangene Woche nach fünf Jahren Bürgerkrieg erstmals zu einem grossen Gefangenenaustausch gekommen. Die IKRK-Delegationsleiterin Katharina Ritz erzählt im Interview, wie die Gefangenen auf ihre Freilassung vorbereitet wurden.

Ritz: Wir haben die Rolle eines neutralen Vermittlers übernommen, der den Gefangenenaustausch umsetzt. Wir haben nicht darüber verhandelt, wer freikommt. Wir haben über den Plan verhandelt, wie man das Abkommen realisiert.

Der Konflikt war in den vergangenen Wochen sehr aktiv. Da weiss man nie, ob eine Vereinbarung wirklich standhält, wenn irgendetwas an der Front passiert. Das IKRK braucht deshalb das Vertrauen der Konfliktparteien. Alle möchten zuerst ihre freigelassenen Gefangenen bekommen. Es waren vier verschiedene Flughäfen involviert. Abha in Saudiarabien, Marib, Seiyun und Sanaa in Jemen. Und wir mussten das so präzise orchestrieren, dass die Flugzeuge fast synchron abflogen. Fünf Flugzeuge mussten wir praktisch zur gleichen Zeit fliegen lassen.

Für die Gefangenen, die zurückgeblieben sind, und die Familien, die warten, ist es ganz sicher eine riesige Enttäuschung. Andererseits: Das Abkommen wurde 2018 ausgehandelt. Das IKRK hat bereits drei Mal einen Gefangenenaustausch vorbereitet, aber er kam nie zustande. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es eher ein Erfolg. Und das hat man wirklich gespürt in Jemen. Für die Leute ist es fast das erste Mal, dass etwas Positives geschehen ist.

(** A P)

Prisoner swap raises Yemenis‘ hope for end of devastating war

The Houthi group held a massive official and public reception for its prisoners. The government did the same in the northeastern province of Marib on Friday after wide criticism for its lackluster reception of the freed prisoners who arrived in the south on Thursday.
Deputy human rights minister, Majed Fadhayel, said further talks on the release of more prisoners will take place later this year.
The next deal will cover four senior government officials, including brother of president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, he said.
We’re happy to see the completion of the release and transfer of 1.056 former detainees, which was carried out with the Yemeni and Saudi Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC wrote on Twitter. „We are encouraged by this success and hope that it leads to more steps towards the transfer and release of more detainees,“ it added.
On Thursday, the Houthi group removed 10 government prisoners from the swap list after a Saudi-led coalition fighting in the country refused to release 10 of its fighters held in Marib.
Meanwhile, the government and the Houthis are trading accusations of subjecting prisoners to torture that has maimed and caused chronic illnesses for some of them.
The government has called on the United Nations and the ICRC to investigate the health conditions of the prisoners and detainees as some of them were released in critical condition.

From their side, the Houthis assured the families of the prisoners who are still in the prisons of the government and coalition that new deals will be reached until all prisoners are released.
We have what we can use to pressure the coalition to release all our prisoners, said chairman of the Houthi committee for prisoners‘ affairs, Abdulqadir Al-Murtada.
Houthi spokesperson, Mohammed Abdulsala, said his group is still holding many Saudi soldiers who will be used as leverage in any future negotiations.
The Houthi mouthpiece TV, Almasirah, quoted Al-Murtada as saying: „The Saudis tried to play the role of meditators in the prisoner talks. We objected and demanded Saudi Arabia be a party in the talks, not a mediator“.
After reaching the latest prisoner swap deal, Saudi Arabia disavowed all foreign prisoners who have fought alongside it and demanded only Saudi soldiers be released, he said, according to the TV.
He hoped the UAE will participate in the next talks after Saudi Arabia, saying that hundreds have been missing in UAE-run regions.
Among challenges we have faced during the negotiations was that the government did not have the authority to sign the lists and agreements without consulting with the coalition states, he added.

(A P)

[Sanaa gov.] Prisoners Affairs’ Official: Islah Party Commits High Treason by Sale of Prisoners to Saudi Arabia

The head of the National Committee for Prisoners Affairs, Abdul Qadir Al-Murtada, revealed the high treason by the Islah Party regarding the sale of prisoners to Saudi Arabia.

Al-Murtada wrote on “Twitter” platform, Saturday, “35 prisoners among the released prisoners from Saudi prisons were captured at the fronts of Marib, Al-Jawf, Shabwah and Al-Baidha.”

He stressed that these prisoners were sold by the “ Islah party“ to the Saudi regime, pointing out that this is considered high treason.

(* A P)

Al-Houthi: We Are Ready for „All for All“ Prisoners’ Swap

The member of the Supreme Political Council, Mohammad Al-Houthi, confirmed, Friday, that exchange of prisoners is humanitarian issue, expressing his regret that not all prisoners came back in a comprehensive exchange.

Mohammad al-Houthi said to Almasirah, „We are ready to exchange all of prisoners,“ stressing that the other side (Saudi-led Forces and mercenaries) is hindering the exchange of prisoners, all for all.

Al-Houthi indicated that all the prisoners are our brothers and we will do our best to free them from the US-Saudi prisons.

and also

(A P)

Al-Houthi Calls for Independent Commission to Investigate Torture of Yemeni War Prisoners

Al-Houthi renewed the call for an independent commission to investigate the torture that Yemeni war prisoners were subjected in the US-Saudi aggression detention centers.

My comment: The Houthis themselves had tortured their prisoners.

(* A P)

20 prisoners excluded by two parties from swap: Houthis

The Houthi group on Thursday excluded 10 prisoners affiliated to the official government troops from the swap, in response to the Arab coalition’s exclusion of Houthi captives detained in Marib.
680 Houthi prisoners were expected to be released, head of the group’s prisoner committee said, but the Saudi-led coalition excepted 10 captives, so the group excluded 10 of the government army captives.
The prisoners should be released on the all-for-all basis by both parties as stated in the Stockholm Agreement, Abdul Kader al-Murtadha added.
Unfortunately, there are „deep disputes between the Yemeni government and the coalition, he claimed.

(* A P)

Including journalists in prisoner swap violates int’l laws: Yemeni PM

The Houthi inclusion of journalists into the prisoner swap deal is in violation of international laws that do not allow for a detainee be exchanged for a war prisoner, the Yemen designate prime minister said Saturday.
The international community and the UN face a real trial and moral responsibility for this issue, Maeen Abdulmalek added, which means they need to pressure the Houthis into ending these gross arbitraries against Yemenis, reporters in particular.
On Friday, the Yemeni PM phoned the 5 journalists released under the prisoner swap sponsored by the IRCR and the office of the UN envoy for Yemen.
He ordered authorities to provide the freed reporters (Essam BalGhaith, Haitham al-Shihab, Hassan Annab, Hisham Tarmoum and Hisham al-Youssefi) with all forms of care and support.

My comment: ?????????????????????????

(A P)

Welcoming Further Release of Detainees in Yemen, Secretary-General Says Prisoner Exchange is Proof Breakthrough Can Be Achieved through Dialogue, Compromise

(A P)

Yemen: Statement by the [EU] Spokesperson on the release of detainees

The release of detainees by the Yemeni parties on 15 and 16 October, in line with the agreement reached in Geneva last month, is a crucial step in the implementation of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement. It is also a reminder that progress can still be made through negotiation and compromise.

The European Union commends the work carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and his office for facilitating the release of the detainees and their reunification with their families.

The EU also welcomes the Yemeni parties’ commitment to continue negotiations on the Prisoner Exchange Agreement.

My comment: Stop selling arms to the Saudi coalition. Then claiming you would be committed to peace in Yemen, is a sign of hypocrisy.

(** A P)

Gefangenenaustausch in Jemen: Minutiös geplanter erster Schritt

Gute Nachrichten aus Jemen: Die Konfliktparteien tauschen Gefangene aus. Was simpel klingt, ist ein politisches und logistisches Monstervorhaben.

Es ist die größte vertrauensbildende Maßnahme, seit der Jemenkrieg vor fünfeinhalb Jahren begonnen hat. Zwei Tage lang sollen rund 1.000 Kriegsgefangene ausgetauscht werden. Mehr als 600 Huthi-Rebellen und 400 gefangene Kämpfer der Regierung in Aden sollen freigelassen und nach Hause gebracht werden. Der Massenaustausch war vergangenen Monat bei UN-gesponserten Gesprächen im schweizerischen Montreux vereinbart worden.

„Allein am Donnerstag hatten wir sieben Flugzeuge mit über 700 freigelassenen Gefangenen, die am Flughafen in Sanaa aus- oder eingeflogen sind“, erklärt die Schweizerin Katharina Ritz, die das Büro des Internationalen Roten Kreuzes (ICRC) in Jemen leitet, gegenüber der taz. „Es hat viel Misstrauen gegeben, deswegen mussten wir minutiös planen. Die Maschinen mussten synchronisiert an drei verschiedenen Orten zum gleichen Moment starten.“

Für Freitag sei erneut eine doppelte Rotation von Flügen zwischen Sanaa und Aden geplant. Damit wäre dann der Austausch von etwas mehr als 1.000 Gefangenen abgeschlossen. „Wir hoffen, dass das eine von vielen zukünftigen Freilassungen sein wird, da noch tausende Familien auf gefangene Verwandte warten“, sagt Ritz.

„Natürlich wünschen wir uns, dass dieser Austausch Vertrauen geschaffen hat, durch das dann mehr Energie in die Suche nach einer politischen Lösung zur Beendigung des Konflikts fließt“, fügt sie hinzu. „Solche humanitären Gesten können ein Zeichen setzen, denn die Menschen sind nach diesem jahrelangen Konflikt müde, ausgelaugt und haben viel verloren.“!5721586/

Film (Tagesschau): =

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Konfliktparteien im Jemen lassen hunderte Gefangene frei

Im Jemen sind am zweiten Tag eines Gefangenenaustausches zwischen der Regierung und den Huthi-Rebellen weitere hunderte Gefangene freigelassen worden.

Madsched Fadael, Mitglied des Regierungskomitees für Gefangenenangelegenheiten, kündigte unterdessen für dieses Jahr ein weiteres Treffen der Unterhändler an. Es werde dann um das Schicksal der restlichen Gefangenen gehen, die die Huthi noch festhielten. «Das nächste Abkommen wird vier führende Regierungsvertreter umfassen», sagte Fadael. Darunter sei General Nasser Mansur Hadi, der Bruder des jemenitischen Präsidenten Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi.

Der zweitägige Gefangenenaustausch wird als Zeichen für Fortschritte bei den Bemühungen gesehen, den jahrelangen Konflikt in dem Bürgerkriegsland zu beenden. Grundlage für den Austausch ist eine Einigung, die zwischen der jemenitischen Regierung und den Huthi Ende September unter UN-Vermittlung zustande gekommen war.

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Gefangenenaustausch im Jemen

Der zwei Tage dauernde Austausch von mehr als 1000 Kriegsgefangenen zwischen den Konfliktparteien im Jemen ist erfolgreich beendet worden. Der Ablauf war auf die Minute genau getaktet

Nachdem am Donnerstag bereits mehr als 700 Gefangene zurückkehren durften, gab es am Freitag Flüge mit zwei Maschinen zur Überstellung von 352 weiteren ehemaligen Gefangenen. Sie flogen zwischen der von der Regierung kontrollierten Stadt Aden und dem von Rebellen kontrollierten Sanaa.

Katharina Ritz, Delegationschefin des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz (IKRK) im Jemen, sprach von einer der größten Austauschaktionen während einer aktiven Kriegsphase, einem gar „historischen Einsatz“. Das IKRK habe die Abflüge der Maschinen auf die Minute genau synchronisieren müssen, um einen fairen Austausch für die rivalisierenden Seiten sicherzustellen, beschrieb sie die besonderen Herausforderungen für Organisatoren (Fotos)

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Yemen: the longest journey home

photos from the release operation that we facilitated in collaboration with the Yemeni and Saudi Red Crescent and the

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Yemen war foes complete two-day prisoner swap

A Saudi-led military coalition, backing the internationally recognised Yemeni government, and its adversary, Yemen’s Houthi movement, agreed last month to exchange 1,081 prisoners, in the largest swap of its kind in the five-year-old conflict.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said 1,056 in total were returned home, adding it hoped this would lead to further detainee releases and transfers.

Men descending from a plane when it landed in Aden, temporary capital of Yemen’s government, prostrated their foreheads to the tarmac. Some embraced waiting friends and relatives.

Landing in Sanaa, released detainee Ahmad Abd al-Wahhab saw his father after three years of absence, having been taken prisoner on Yemen’s west coast.

“I am experiencing indescribable happiness and feelings beyond imagination,” Wahhab said after disembarking.

In Sanaa on Thursday night, celebratory fireworks crackled in the night sky as buses carrying returned prisoners moved down a road lined with people cheering in welcome.

On Friday 352 prisoners were exchanged after more than 700 were swapped on Thursday — including a plane carrying Saudis and Sudanese to Riyadh — said the ICRC, which managed the process.

ICRC planes shuttled twice between Aden city and the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa on Friday, taking 151 detainees to Aden and 201 to Sanaa.

The head of the Houthis’ prisoners’ committee told Al Masirah that seven bodies of men who died in detention had been received so far and another is expected to arrive on Saturday. He also said he hoped another, bigger swap deal could be agreed.

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Celebrations as Yemen civil war prisoners freed in huge swap

The exchange led to scenes of celebration and triumph inside Yemen. UN diplomats said they hoped the bulk of the swap would be completed over the next two days.

The exchange has involved a complex compilation of agreed lists of names, logistical planning, and the slow build-up of trust between the parties in the six-year civil war. The diplomats hope some of the trust could yet be used to open the way for talks on an interim national joint declaration and ceasefire.

Local media at both airports heard prisoners’ stories of beatings and torture, as well as claims that they had been used as human shields, or captured despite being civilians.

The ICRC Near East regional director, Fabrizio Carboni, said he had received many questions from prisoners, their families and others asking whether the transfer “was really happening”. He responded on Twitter: “I am more than happy to answer that the release operation has started in Yemen. This has been in the making for two years. It is a long process that will last for days, but it will end with families reuniting and that is what matters.”

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70 of Requested to be Released, by US-Saudi Aggression, Al-Qaedah Individuals

[Sanaa gov.] Armed Forces spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Sare’e, confirmed that enemy’s prisoners were mostly captured on the front lines, but 70 of them are al-Qaeda individuals, in addition to those involved in sending coordinates and killing civilians.

Brigadier General Saree said to Almasirah, Friday, that the enemy demanded release of prisoners from Al-Qaeda organization, who have major crimes.

He explained that our morals and religion dictate that we treat the prisoners with respect and honor, but many of our prisoners were killed in the enemy’s prisons.

He revealed that many of the released prisoners came back with signs of torture, even some of them were tortured days before they were released. He added, „We honor the prisoners, protect them from air strikes, transport them to safe places, and allow them to communicate with their families.“

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7 Prisoners Killed in Aggression’s Prisons: Abdul Qader Al-Murtada

The head of the [Sanaa gov.] Committee for Prisoners‘ Affairs, Abdul Qader Al-Murtada, confirmed that the party of the aggression insisted that the deal include a number of Al-Qaeda members and individuals that committed bombings and assassinations.

In an interview with Almasirah, Friday, Al-Murtada said that the forces of aggression refused to include Saudi prisoners, who were captured at the border frontlines, during the exchange deal, explaining that it was agreed to conclude a new deal waiting for the United Nations to organize the meeting.

He revealed that 7 of the prisoners in the aggression’s prisons, who were included in the exchange list, had been killed. He added: „we believe that they were liquidated, and the forensic doctor confirmed that they were tortured and we will reveal the details in the coming days.

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Abdulsalam Announces Completion of First Phase of War Prisoner Exchange

The head of National Delegation, Mohammed Abdulsalam, announced the completion of the first phase of the exchange of war prisoners and detainees, as 671 prisoners of war from the Army and the Popular Committees arrived in Sana’a.

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Two planes carrying 200 prisoners of army arrive at Sana’a airport

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5th, 6th Batches of Prisoners Arrived at Sana’a International Airport

The fifth and sixth planes, carrying two batches of prisoners of the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees, arrived at Sana’a International Airport.

The prisoners were received by a delegation from the office of the Leader of the Revolution, Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, large number of leaders of the Salvation Government, civilians and soldiers, in addition to the member of the Supreme Political Council, Mohammad Al-Houthi, and a number of ministers.

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Large Popular Crowds Flock to Sana’a Airport to Receive Prisoners

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Official, Public Reception for Released War Prisoners at Sana’a Airport

Since the early morning hours, Sana’a International Airport witnessed a large official and popular presence to participate in the reception ceremony for the released prisoners. The leaderships led the masses of those receiving the released prisoners at Sana’a airport, where red carpets were laid and orchestras were played for them.



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[Sanaa gov.] Armed Forces Spokesman: Exchanging of War Prisoners Is Great Humanitarian, Political, Military Achievement

Spokesman of Armed Forces, Brigadier General Yahya Sare’e, confirmed, on Thursday, that success of the first phase of the exchange of Yemeni war prisoners is a great humanitarian, political and military success.

Brigadier General Yahya told Almasirah that this achievement came as a result of a great move by the leader of the revolution, Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, despite the great obstinacy of US-Saudi aggression.

He pointed out that some of the released war prisoners today have been for nearly 5 years in captivity by the aggression forces, stressing that we care about the enemy’s prisoners and provide them with services unlike what the other side does.

He congratulates the families of the freed war prisoners, stressing that we will do everything we can to get all our prisoners out of the prisons of the occupiers.

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Arrival of 4th batch of Freed War Prisoners at Sana’a International Airport

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YJS calls for other Yemeni abductees be released

The Yemeni Journalist Syndicate (YJS) on Thursday welcomed the release of five reporters as part of the prisoner swap between the official government and the Houthi group.
Earlier on Thursday, the Houthis freed 221 prisoners affiliated to the government, including five journalists (Essam BalGhaith, Haitham al-Shihab, Hassan Annab, Hisham Tarmoum and Hisham al-Youssefi) after more than five years of detention in the group’s jails.
In a statement, YJS called on the UN special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, to continue efforts to release other kidnapped reporters.

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Prisoners of southern resistance, joint forces arrive in Aden

An ICRC plane landed in Aden International Airport on Friday, carrying a batch of prisoners of the Southern Resistance and the joint forces on the West Coast as part of the U.N.-mediated agreement reached last month in Switzerland to exchange 1,081 prisoners of war.
Upon their arrival, the returnees got warm and enthusiastic reception by a huge crowd of waiting friends and relatives accompanied by a brass band.

Photos: (from Seiyun airport)


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Marib publically welcomes captives released by Houthis

The Yemeni northeastern city of Marib witnessed on Friday a massively public and official reception of the prisoners released by the Houthis on Thursday and Friday under a swap between the group and the legitimate government.


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President Hadi orders to provide healthcare for released prisoners

Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi has ordered the government to provide healthcare to the prisoners freed by the Houthi group under a prisoner swap deal mediated by the UN and coordinated by the ICRC.

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Yemeni official wants deaths in Houthi detention probed

Amid prisoner swap with Houthis, [Hadi gov.] Yemeni information minister voices concerns over well-being of released prisoners

Yemen’s minister for information called for an urgent investigation into deaths and torture of prisoners kept in the Houthi prisons.

Muammar al-Eryani demanded an “urgent and transparent investigation” about the prisoners who died of psychological and physical torture, SABA news agency Thursday citied him as saying. The minister did not give the number of prisoners who lost their lives.

Eryani urged the UN and the International Committee of the Red Crescent (ICRC) to examine the health conditions of the prisoners released. He stated that some of them have become physically handicapped and are going through psychological problems.

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Photo: As an expression of their thanks and appreciation for his efforts in taking care of the issue of the kidnapped and disappeared journalists of the Houthi coup militia Watch the first meeting that brought together journalists released after five years of kidnapping by a militia with the head of the Committee of Prisoners and Abductees in the government team, Sheikh Hadi Haig

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4 #Yemeni journalists unjustly jailed by a Houthi court have been freed today. Abdel-Khaleq Amran, Akram al-Walidi, Hareth Hamid and Tawfiq al-Mansouri are still on death row in Yemen while being denied their basic right to a fair trial (photos)

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“My heart is like hell,” the mother of journalist Tawfeeq Almansoori said showing her disappointment that her son was not among the released prisoners. Tawfeeq has been forcibly disappeared by Houthis for over 5 years now.

referring to film

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Mwatana: Civilians—whose release was long past due—were included in the exchange. There remain many civilians arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared by all sides in #Yemen. They should be released immediately and unconditionally

“Mwatana” considers this an important step on the road to implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, and calls for redoubling efforts to completely resolve the detention file in #Yemen.

Finally, “Mwatana” urges conflict parties in #Yemen to swiftly take steps to end arbitrary detention, disappearance & torture under all circumstances, to reveal fate of disappeared & to allow those arbitrarily detained to return to their families and their relatives unharmed

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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Coalition gave landing permission for plane carrying Iran’s ambassador to Sanaa, TV

A Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen gave permission to the plane which carried the new Iranian ambassador to land at Sanaa airport, a diplomat has told Belqees TV.
The ambassador arrived on a private plane that flew direct from Tehran, the TV said on Sunday.
Meanwhile, the office of the UN envoy to Yemen has denied its involvement in the transfer of the Iranian diplomat Hassan Erlo into Sanaa, urging media professionals to check and verify information before publishing through contacting its communications team.

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«Unsere Zeit kommt wieder, wenn sich die Machthaber sicher fühlen»

Ein Gespräch mit Dr. Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi zur revolutionären Bewegung in Jemen

Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi ist Mitherausgeber des digitalen Kulturmagazins Almadaniya, wo er für Literatur und Wissenschaft verantwortlich ist. Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi hat an der Universität Erlangen zu jemenitischen Identitäten in der modernen jemenitischen Literatur promoviert. Neben seiner Arbeit für Almadaniya unterrichtet Dr. al-Rubaidi an unterschiedlichen jemenitischen Universitäten.

Mit ihm sprach Mareike Transfeld, Leiterin des Yemen Policy Centers, ein deutsch-jemenitischer Think Tank in Berlin. Sie ist Doktorandin an der Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies und Associate Fellow beim Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn.

Warum ist die Jugendrevolution gescheitert?

Ich möchte zwei Gründe aufführen, um das zu erklären. Zum einen waren die gierigen traditionellen Eliten nicht bereit, der neuen Generation eine Chance zur Umsetzung ihres revolutionären Projekts zu geben. Damit meine ich die, die an der Macht waren, wie Präsident Ali Abdullah Saleh und seine Unterstützer*innen oder die Eliten der Parteien und Stämme. Diese Eliten arbeiteten nicht für das Gemeinwohl, aber sie kämpften hart, um diese Revolution zu unterdrücken, um ihre Privilegien behalten zu können. Diese Elite war erfolgreich, denn sie verfügte über Mittel und über Waffen. Die Revolutionär*innen waren unbewaffnet und meist jung, auch nicht reich. Sie konnten die Politiker und hochrangigen Offiziere, Kaufleute und Stammesführer nicht herausfordern.

Die Regionalstaaten, angeführt von Saudi-Arabien, und die Vereinten Nationen griffen schließlich ein, um einen politischen Übergang zu regeln. Denn die Nachbarstaaten hatten Angst, die Revolution könnte sich in einen Bürgerkrieg entwickeln. Immerhin führte das zur Desertion einiger Regimeanhänger. Durch das Abkommen, das die UN vermittelt hat, kam schließlich Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi an die Macht. Er wurde 2012 durch eine Wahl in seinem Amt als Präsident bestätigt. Jedoch fehlte ihm jegliches Charisma, er konnte diese historische Chance nicht nutzen und brachte die revolutionäre Straße nicht auf seine Seite, um das Land voranzubringen. So konnte kein echter Bruch mit der Vergangenheit vollzogen werden. Stattdessen waren er und seine Regierung vollständig von der internationalen Gemeinschaft abhängig. Und wie wir alle wissen, verfolgten besonders die Golfstaaten eine konterrevolutionäre Agenda, und dies auch im Jemen.

Trotz dieses Scheiterns gab es dank der Revolutionsbestrebungen einige Veränderungen. Den Armen und Schwachen im Jemen gab die Revolution Hoffnung.

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The Failed Saudi War

Inside and outside Yemen, the hopeless Saudi-American war is marching towards its sixth year, with an unprecedented intention to a bloody failure and complete fall. Saudi Arabia and its allies are increasing their craziness, trying to divert attention from the crimes against humanity by committing more horrible crimes. The pretext here is: national security, the concept that Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo are always hanging on to. They are all fighting Yemenis to protect their national security while they are groveling to Netanyahu! The war against Yemen is the same as any war that happened in history; not more than leaders seeking a “monumental” and peerless military achievement that would legitimize their victory. During a historical crisis that all Arabic regimes are experiencing, the Zionist entity became their friend, ally and brother, in the face of people who are materially the poorest in the Arab Region and Arabian Peninsula.
Starting with the western media, the American primarily and the European secondly, Gulf regimes fought the first battle, led by bin Zayed and bin Salman, to buy consciences and stances, succeeding to make the war against Yemen tenable through the world. It wasn’t harder in the Arab World as Qatar joined them with its channels at the beginning of the war, then it encouraged other countries such as Egypt and Sudan to join the alliance.
At the beginning of the war, more than 5 years ago, all stances were ready to be sold, and the money of Al Saud and Al Zayed was ready to buy them. They succeeded to mark their missiles, tanks and warships by “morality” and direct them towards a defenseless nation.
The leadership of the aggression alliance achieved what appeared to be the media victory, in the inauguration of its military campaign against Yemen. All voices that had been opposing the war were silent, or silenced.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates tried so hard to conceal their intervention in Yemen using the moral cover in a region which, looking at everyone and everything in it, seems like a slaughterhouse. No matter how much they might try to beautify themselves, they will never seem peaceful. As it proceeded, the war continued to exhaust the capacity of the two states, which everyone thought endless.

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Al-Jubeir predicted defeat of Houthis in three weeks: advisor

A senior foreign policy advisor to the Iranian Parliament speaker has said that Saudi Arabia thought it could defeat the Houthis in Yemen in just three weeks but has failed to reach its goal in nearly six years.

In remarks on Friday, Hossein Amir Abdollahian pointed to his meeting as deputy foreign minister with then-Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir in the early days of the Yemen war, saying, “Al-Jubeir emphasized in that meeting that they will annihilate the Houthis in northern Yemen in less than three weeks.”

“But today, we are on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the American, British, Israeli, Saudi and Emirati aggression against Yemen,” Amir Abdollahian said, adding that the aggressors are desperately seeking to exit Yemen, IRNA reported.

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On World Food Day CARE warns of worsening hunger for vulnerable Yemenis

After almost six years of war, Yemen’s economic ecosystem has been decimated, leaving up to 20 million people food insecure. The combination of armed conflict, COVID-19, and the lack of foreign currency and salary payments has created a precarious situation in which the majority of the population would not be able to survive without humanitarian assistance.

„Economic factors have a direct and devastating impact on the availability and affordability of food,“ says Aaron Brent, CARE Yemen Country Director. „Food prices have been rising throughout 2020, adding to the misery of families who were already struggling. „We are seeing an increase in negative coping strategies including selling personal possessions like clothes and furniture, borrowing money, begging and using up savings. The UN has even referred to the ’spectre of famine‘.“

Food and fuel imports have significantly decreased in 2020, leading to price rises which mean people increasingly can’t afford the basics; in Sana’a, market assessments found that the price of fruit and vegetables had risen by 125 percent, and in Aden the exchange rate has reached an historic low.1 Intensified fighting is also limiting people’s access to food and fuel, leaving them increasingly vulnerable; hunger is most pronounced in in areas with high levels of armed violence.

Taiz governorate has seen consistent fighting through the conflict

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Rights experts urge UAE to halt repatriation of Yemeni nationals

The repatriation of 18 Yemeni nationals previously held at the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay, should be halted, as their lives could be in danger, UN-appointed human rights experts said on Thursday.

In an appeal to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the Yemeni men were resettled after their release, the independent experts cautioned that “their forced return (to Yemen would) put their lives at risk”.

The fact that non-State armed actors control parts of the country “does not allow the provision nor compliance with diplomatic assurances”, the experts said, adding that such assurances “where provided, do not release States from their international obligations …in particular the principle of non-refoulement”.

The independent experts, or Special Rapporteurs, also noted with concern that that the men faced “continuous arbitrary detention at an undisclosed location” in the UAE. They were allegedly forced to sign documents agreeing to their repatriation, the experts said, or else “remain indefinitely in Emirati detention…without charge or trial”.

They also insisted that no State has the right to expel, return or otherwise remove any individual from its territory whenever there were “substantial grounds” to believe that the person would be in danger of torture in the State of destination.

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[from 2019] Yemen’s nested conflict(s): Layers, geographies and feuds

Due to the 2015 civil war, Yemen’s national order has vanished. Whatever viable attempt of conflict resolution must take into account a variety of existing micro-orders on a local basis. Deconstructing Yemen’s layers of conflict, this essay traces post-2015 internal transformations of power, arguing that Yemen has started a process of gradual feudalisation, based on militias and warlords, thus shifting from a multiple geographies scheme to an archipelago-like system of connected but rival feuds.

Framing the Yemeni war as a single conflictis not only a simplification, but it is also misleading. Yemen has been shattered by a number of nested and intertwined conflicts.

This perspective can help to shed light on the extreme complexity of conflict resolution, with particular regard to the proposals which apply a nationally-centred framework. The genealogy of Yemen’s conflict(s) is pre-dominantly domestic, rooted in inter-élite rivalries originating from the crisis of the Sana’a-based system of power, local claimsfor autonomy, and social unbalances. The 2015 war started as a political dispute for power and resources involving internal actors. It was the violent outcome of the failure of the 2011 uprising against Ali Abdullah Saleh’sregime, which provoked a change within the regime but not a change of the regime, thusleaving much of the territorial grievances not addressed (as in the Houthis’ northern landsand the Southern Movement’s aspirations for autonomy/independence). But for as long as the violence has spread, the nature of the war has dramatically evolved, given the growing direct and/or indirect involvement of regional players. As a matter of fact, the Saudi and Emirati-led military intervention, which started in March 2015 to reinstate the internationally-recognised interim government (after theHouthi coup in Sana’a in January 2015), has contributed to the regionalising of a series of rifts generated by domestic causes. This has also bolstered Iran’s indirect presence in theYemeni scenario, with its incremental military support for the Houthi insurgency. Therefore, the role of regional actors has altered internal balances, maximising Yemen’s fragmentation in territorial feuds relying on militias,most of them loosely connected to three competing centres of power – by Eleonora Ardemagni


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[from 2018] Fragmentation and Localization in Yemen’s War: Challenges and Opportunities for Peace

This Brief argues that the war in Yemen has been misunderstood in at least twoessential respects and that each of these constitutes a barrier to sustainable conflict resolution. First, the war is approached in formal diplomacy and public discourse alike as a single war between two primary factions, when in fact there are at least four arenas of conflict. Each of these arenas has distinct antagonists, methods, and aims; and none of them, alone or in combination, are explainedby seeing the war as either a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran or as a conflict between Houthi insurgents and the “central government” of President Abd Rabuh Mansour Hadi. Although there are elements of truth to the proxy-warframing, the sectarian dynamics of the war in Yemen have been created by the war more than they have driven it—and they take on different form and significance across the various arenas of conflict. Second, and as a consequence, the war is characterized by dual dynamics of fragmentation and localization, in both securityand humanitarian dimensions. These processes of fragmentation and localization began well before 2015, but regional actors have been attracted by the fragmentary nature of the conflict in Yemen and have helped to exacerbate that fragmentation.

Taken together, these sources of misunderstanding or mischaracterization have contributed to a stalled diplomatic process, suggesting that just as the experience of the war is not singular, the challenges of peacebuilding are not uniform – by Stacey Philbrick Yadav

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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New ships carrying around 30 tons of benzene enters Hodeidah seaport

A new fuel ship has arrived in Hodeidah province in western Yemen after it had been held at sea by a Saudi-led coalition fighting in the country for 174.
The ship, Nimah, entered Hodeidah seaport on Tuesday, carrying 27.972 tons of benzene, the Sanaa-based Yemen petroleum company said.
It was the fourth ship to enter the port in recent weeks. On Monday, the company said a ship carrying 27.487 tons of diesel arrived at the port after it had been held by the coalition for 86 days.
Two other ships carrying 85.502 tons of diesel arrived earlier.

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Gas ship arrives at port of Hodeida

Claudia ship carries 7,865 tons of domestic gas, the deputy executive director of Yemen Gas Company (YGC) Mohammed al-Qudaimi told Saba.

Earlier, Yemen Petroleum Company Eng. Ammar al-Adhru’ai stated that 19 ships are still detained by the aggression carrying 232,955 tons of gasoline, 176,574 tons of diesel, 16,356 tons of domestic gas, and 40,502 tons of Mazut.

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Oil Tanker detention costs US$ 4 million: Sana’a YPC

The detention of ‚Damas‘ oil tanker has cost over US$ 4 million in demurrage, the Houthi-run Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said Sunday.
Having been detained by the Arab coalition in the Red Sea for 200 days, the vessel arrived at Hodeida port 75 days after the arrival of another oil tanker assigned for general consumption, the YPC added in a brief statement.
Damas is loaded with 29,000 tons of diesel, the statement said, accusing the UN of contributing to all the international piracy crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition.
The YPC „preserves its full claim to fair compensation for all losses resulted from these crimes,“ it said.

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YPC Holds UN Responsible for Continued Aggression’s Piracy of Oil Ships

The Yemeni Oil Company held the United Nations and the Saudi-American aggression coalition responsible for what happened due to the marine piracy on fuel ships, confirming that the last two stations to supply citizens with gasoline will ran out today.

The CEO of the company said,Sunday in a series of tweets: The last two stations operating in the Republic of Yemen to supply citizens with gasoline, are about to run out today, so that all stations are 100% off.

He added, „The United Nations and the coalition of aggression bear the responsibility of what the situation has turned out. He explained that the Yemeni people incurred delay fines exceeding $150 million on ships that obtained UN permits. They were subjected to the procedures of the verification and inspection mechanism in Djibouti by the UNVIM committee.

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Damas ship docks at port of Hodeida

Damas ship docked on Saturday in the port of Hodeida carrying 29,491 tons of diesel.

The ship was held by the aggression coalition for nearly 200 days at sea despite having a permit by the United Nations.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

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WB to assign $ 371mln for three projects in Yemen

A team of the World Bank (WB) announced that the portfolio projects allotted to Yemen which will be approved in March 2021 designed to cover the integrated projects of education, social protection and urbanization services with total cost $371 million.

The announcement came during virtual meeting on Tuesday brought together [Hadi gov.] Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Dr. Najeeb al-Aweg, Minister of Education Dr. Abdullah Lamlas and the Regional Director of the WB group for Yemen, Egypt and Djibouti Marina Wes, Country Director of the WB in Yemen Tania Mayer and the technical team of the WB office in Yemen.

A team of the World Bank (WB) announced that the portfolio projects allotted to Yemen which will be approved in March 2021 designed to cover the integrated projects of education, social protection and urbanization services with total cost $371 million.

The announcement came during virtual meeting on Tuesday brought together Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Dr. Najeeb al-Aweg, Minister of Education Dr. Abdullah Lamlas and the Regional Director of the WB group for Yemen, Egypt and Djibouti Marina Wes, Country Director of the WB in Yemen Tania Mayer and the technical team of the WB office in Yemen.

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Yemen: Organizations Monthly Presence (August 2020)

In August 2020, 102 organizations implemented Humanitarian Response Plan activities across all of Yemen’s 333 districts. 10 UN agencies were active in 331 districts, 33 international NGOs were active in 252 districts, and 59 national NGOs were active in 300 districts. The highest number of organizations were Health partners – 41 worked in 278 districts, Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) partners – 37 organizations were active in 282 districts.

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UNO kürzt Jemen-Hilfe

Die UNO werde ihre Hauptprogramme im Jemen bis zum Ende des Jahres reduzieren, teilte der Sprecher des UN-Generalsekretärs, Stéphane Dujarric, gestern mit.

Die Reduzierung der Finanzierung für die UN-Programme lähme die humanitären Operationen im Jemen. Tatsächlich würden 16 Programme in diesem Land entweder geschwächt oder gestoppt, erklärte Dujarric.

26 weitere von 41 UNO-Programmen werden laut dem Sprecher des UN-Generalsekretärs bis Ende 2020 gestoppt.

Bisher wurden dem Bericht zufolge 42 Prozent der humanitären UN-Hilfsprojekte im Jemen finanziert.ürzt_jemen_hilfe

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UN closes 16 major programs in Yemen, and warns of a humanitarian disaster

The United Nations announced, on Monday, that it has reduced and suspended 16 UN programs in Yemen, and said that 26 others are threatened with closure until the end of this year unless they receive additional funding.

„The lack of funding has crippled humanitarian operations in Yemen … 16 of the 41 major UN programs have already been curtailed and suspended,“ UN Secretary-General spokesman Stephane Dujarric said in a press briefing.

„Another 26 services will be closed or reduced by the end of the year, unless additional funding is received,“ added Stephane Dujarric.

„So far, only 42 percent of the humanitarian response plan for Yemen has been funded, which is the lowest level ever at the end of the year,“ he said.

A spokesperson for the Secretary-General called on donors to „pay unpaid pledges and increase support.“

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WHO Yemen Situation Report, September 2020 – Issue No.9


Funding shortage is putting at risk critical WHO programmes, including the Minimum Service Package (MSP) and outbreak preparedness and response, potentially affecting millions of people across the country.

COVID-19 reported cases continue to decline, but indicators suggest that the virus is still spreading, and the number of confirmed cases and deaths fall below actual numbers.

In addition to the 15 cases that had been detected in Sa’adah Governorate, clusters of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases have been reported in the governorates of Al Jawf, Al Mahaweet and Amran.

Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) team in Sana’a has started implementing the first round of Integrated Outreach round in the northern governorates.

A Dengue fever control campaign was launched in Aden city to ensure protection to the 1.7 million total population of the city.

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Map: Yemen: Access Constraints as of 19 October 2020

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Yemen Fact Sheet – How is UNHCR cash assistance used by IDPs in Yemen, October 2020

UNHCR implements the largest Cash-Based Interventions (CBI) for displaced families (IDPs) in Yemen. Families who have lost their homes and livelihoods as a result of the ongoing fighting, flooding and COVID-19 are regularly assessed based upon socioeconomic criteria, including their living conditions (shelter) combined with some protection vulnerabilities analysis. Income, the size of the family, the current shelter arrangement and other considerations, such as disability or children at risk are thus considered. Depending on their vulnerability scoring, families are provided with over-the-counter cash payments to help cover immediate needs, pay rent or be better protected against the winter conditions. This scoring allows UNHCR to target the most vulnerable.

UNHCR Yemen monitors cash assistance through its corporate Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) tool

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Musaid Foundation, Film: Jemen Hilfsaktion Waisenfamilien Nähkurse

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Musaid Foundation, Film: jemen Bildungsprojekt für Behinderte Kinder

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Musaid Foundation, Film: Yemen Kinder freudeschenken

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UNFPA Response in Yemen: Monthly Situation Report #09 September 2020

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world; driven by five years of conflict and political instability. Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, including internal displacement, famine, outbreaks of cholera and COVID-19. An estimated 24.1 million people – over 80 per cent of the population – are in need of some form of assistance, including 14.4 million who are in acute need.

COVID-19 continued to spread across the country in September.

The uptick in fighting in and around Marib continued into September leading to an influx of internally displaced persons. Initial reports estimate more than 3,000 households (18,000 individuals) have been displaced since the beginning of September 2020 alone.

Lack of funding is crippling the UN’s humanitarian operation in Yemen

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Yemen: RDP Monthly Situation Report (September 2020)


RDP registers 783 new MAM cases under the TSFP program in Sama and As Silw districts of Taizz governorates.

RDP serves the nutrition needs of 145,696 beneficiaries under the BSFP program in 12 districts of Taizz, IBB, Dhamar, and Hajjah governorates.

RDP improves behavioral changes for 112,688 individuals through awareness-raising campaigns on health and nutrition key messages in 12 districts of Taizz, IBB, Dhamar, and Hajjah governorates.


RDP resumes its work in Rahaba district as the security risk soars in Al-Abdiyah district of Marib governorate, attaining a total of 1,304 beneficiaries of reproductive health care, vaccinations, and medical consultations.

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From Trash to Treasure: Breathing New Life into Ja’ar’s Local Market

With clogged sewers and a severe water shortage, the Ja’ar central market was forced to close its doors. Unsafe for its produce farmers and butchers to operate, the residents in the capital of Khanfar District had no local marketplace to buy their goods, and local merchants no place to earn cash for their crops.

Home to more than 70,000 people, Ja’ar is one of the largest settlements in the in southwestern Abyan Governorate. Before the conflict erupted in 2015, the central marketplace was a bustling public exchange, but in 2016 the doors closed. As the conflict continued, the problems worsened as the cost and time to fix them increased.

Forced to sell their produce on the street, the town faced serious traffic issues as the paths intended for pedestrians became overcrowded with carts and tables. “Sellers are on both sides of the street, creating traffic jams and affecting the movement of people,” Naser Almansari, the Khanfar District Director explains. “Sellers dispose of waste in the street; it’s not a healthy practice. Even worse, the fish and vegetables are exposed to dust and flies.” The need to fix the marketplace was becoming more critical to return order and cleanliness to Ja’ar.

As time passed, the market’s dilapidated space – now used routinely for garbage disposal – began spilling into the streets and concern of a disease outbreak increased. With no alternate market within close distance, UNDP Yemen’s Supporting Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen Joint Programme (ERRYJP II), employed people from the local community to restore the building to its former glory.

This meant that 150 Yemenis (including 23 women) were also able to earn an immediate income through cash-for-work, completing the cleaning, electrical work, painting and sewage repairs that were critical to the markets re-opening. In total, 20 tons of waste were removed, and with a fresh coat of paint, energy was returned to a previously dank space.–breathing-new-life-into-jaars-local-mark.html

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Yemen’s ‘microgrid girls’ power community amid war and COVID-19

A women-run solar station near the front line in Abs is empowering its owners and improving life in their community.

“The role of women was housework only,” laments Huda Othman Hassan, a young woman from Abs, a rural district in the north of Yemen, near the border with Saudi Arabia.

“Although we are educated and university graduates, we had no decision-making power and couldn’t work in any field.”

But now a new project is helping shift those norms. Last year, Othman and nine other women in Abs set up a solar microgrid, just 32km (20 miles) from the front line in a war that has killed tens of thousands and left more than 3.3 million people displaced.

The project is one of three the United Nations Development Programme helped put in place in front line off-grid communities in the country. The Abs station is the only one run entirely by women.

The other two – located in the Bani Qais district near Abs, and in the Lahij governorate in the southern part of the country – are managed by 10 young men each; 30 percent of them are people who are displaced.

Before the Abs station was built, Othman says, the high price of commercial electricity meant her community was unable to access it. “Most people used a flashlight or a five-watt bulb on a small battery,” she says.

Now, the solar microgrid provides the community with cheaper, clean, and renewable energy, while also tackling another major issue in this part of Yemen – helping women earn a stable income and gain new professional skills.

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Film: Hajjah Governorate’s Farmers Incur Hefty Losses in Light of Houthi Militias’ Siege.

Spoiled crops pose a threat to Hajjah governorate’s farmers, in light of the siege imposed by Houthi militias. More than 4000 families, living in the government-run areas, are suffering from dire humanitarian conditions following the constant refugee movements and the ever-lasting conflicts between governmental forces and Houthis for more than 5 years. Residents of these areas rely solely for their livelihood on farming, in which hundreds work in planting vegetables and fruits. Farmers complain about hefty losses in crops yield as the imposed siege barred them from marketing their crops in the local market, not to mention the poor economic reality

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Cancer Patients .. Premeditated Mass Murder: Report

With the continued blockade and piracy on oil vessels and the closure of Sana’a International Airport, cancer patients continue to pay their lives for all this arrogance and criminality of the aggression coalition amid suspicious Arab and International silence and amid the shameful role of the United Nations.

The National Oncology Center in the capital Sana’a and the only one in Yemen as radiotherapy and chemotherapy are the most common types of cancer treatment, it is also suffering from a severe shortage of medical devices and therapeutic drugs due to the all-inclusive blockade imposed on Yemen as well as the closure of the airport.

The center receives in its outpatient clinics approximately 160 cases per day from various provinces of Yemen, while 6,000 new cases are registered per year.

Cases reach about 20,000 at the level of Yemen. This number is very large compared to 2014, according to the Director-General of the National Center for Oncology, Dr. Abdullah Dahan Thawaba.

Dr. Thawaba noted that the center accommodates 75 beds for men, women and children departments, and ‚on the only radiation machine‘ the radiation department receives 120 sessions five days a week, equivalent to 600 clinical cases per week.

The external administration department receives 84 cases per day for chemotherapy, and the emergency department receives approximately 200 cases per day, bringing the number of cases to 6,000 annually.

„There are a number of units that are being prepared and during this year units of chemotherapy for cancer patients will be inaugurated in Amran, Hajjah, Sa’ada and Dhamar provinces, Allah almighty willing“, said Dr. Thawaba in a special statement to website.

The units in Hajjah, Dhamar, and Amran provinces have started work during this year, Dr. Thawaba said, pointing out the units of Aden, Hodeida, Taiz, Ibb, and Mukalla are working very well, but they lack some medical supplies for the reasons of the aggression and siege on Yemen.

Dr. Thawaba explained that the Oncology Center in Sana’a will soon be supplied with a new building located next to the building of the capital Sanaa, adding: “We wish the governor of the capital Sanaa to cooperate with the center to obtain the new building to relieve cancer patients and open a surgical unit for tumor surgery“.

He stressed that when all treatment services for cancer patients are completed, the center will be transformed into a hospital.

Dr. Thawaba pointed out that the aggression prevented the entry of radioactive sources into Yemen and stopped two out of three devices. Moreover, the third device is in its last days because it has been operating for more than five years at an efficiency of 38%, as the efficiency of this device when it reaches 30% will unfortunately stop running.

He held the international community and international and relief organizations, led by the World Health Organization, responsible for the absence of basic and necessary medicines such as radioactive iodine, as it is a special medicine for treating patients that ‚has nothing to do with wars‘, when the cancer patients use it, it is considered 100% curative effectiveness.

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100 new shelters for families who lost their homes in the recent flooding in #Yemen are now complete thanks to our partnership with @monarelief & generous funding from @Karmagawa and @timothysykes

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Estimating access to health care in Yemen, a complex humanitarian emergency setting: a descriptive applied geospatial analysis


Background: In conflict settings, data to guide humanitarian and development responses are often scarce. Although geospatial analyses have been used to estimate health-care access in many countries, such techniques have not been widely applied to inform real-time operations in protracted health emergencies. Doing so could provide a more robust approach for identifying and prioritising populations in need, targeting assistance, and assessing impact. We aimed to use geospatial analyses to overcome such data gaps in Yemen, the site of one of the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crises.

Methods: We derived geospatial coordinates, functionality, and service availability data for Yemen health facilities from the Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System assessment done by WHO and the Yemen Ministry of Public Health and Population. We modelled population spatial distribution using high-resolution satellite imagery, UN population estimates, and census data. A road network grid was built from OpenStreetMap and satellite data and modified using UN Yemen Logistics Cluster data and other datasets to account for lines of conflict and road accessibility. Using this information, we created a geospatial network model to deduce the travel time of Yemeni people to their nearest health-care facilities.

Findings: In 2018, we estimated that nearly 8·8 million (30·6%) of the total estimated Yemeni population of 28·7 million people lived more than 30-min travel time from the nearest fully or partially functional public primary health-care facility, and more than 12·1 million (42·4%) Yemeni people lived more than 1 h from the nearest fully or partially functional public hospital, assuming access to motorised transport. We found that access varied widely by district and type of health service, with almost 40% of the population living more than 2 h from comprehensive emergency obstetric and surgical care. We identified and ranked districts according to the number of people living beyond acceptable travel times to facilities and services. We found substantial variability in access and that many front-line districts were among those with the poorest access.

Interpretation: These findings provide the most comprehensive estimates of geographical access to health care in Yemen since the outbreak of the current conflict, and they provide proof of concept for how geospatial techniques can be used to address data gaps and rigorously inform health programming. Such information is of crucial importance for humanitarian and development organisations seeking to improve effectiveness and accountability.

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

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According to the International Organisation for Migration, 154000 Yemenis have been displaced since the start of 2020, with 340 families (about 2000 people) displaced last week due to the recent fighting in several #Yemen-i provinces.

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Republic of Yemen: Shelter/NFIs Fact Sheet, September 2020

Needs Analysis

The rainy season has been very intense this year and resulted in heavy rainfall and floods that principally affected lower-elevation areas of Yemen. Until September 2020, an estimated 62,508 families have been affected across the country.
The fast-approaching winter season is expected to be harsh for more than half a million vulnerable people with acute needs, exposed to low temperatures, and unable to prepare adequately for the season.


Despite the current operational constraints, Shelter Cluster assisted nearly 0.35 million IDPs, returnees, and vulnerable host community members during the third quarter of 2020.
In response to needs resulted from the rainy season, Shelter Cluster reached 25,653 families with 17,245 NFIs and 14,655 Emergency Shelter Kits, which represent 41% of reported needs up to the end of September. Needs assessments are still ongoing.
Shelter Cluster developed and released the Winterization Recommendations with a total requirement of US$14.3m to address acute needs.

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IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) – Reporting Period: 11 – 17 October 2020

From 01 January 2020- 17 October 2020, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 25,634 Households (153,804 Individuals) have experienced displacement, at least once.

Since the beginning of 2020, DTM also identified other 1,238 previously displaced households who left the displaced location and moved to either their place of origin or some other displaced location.

Between the 11 October 2020 and 17 October 2020, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 340 Households (2,040 individuals) displaced at least once, the highest number of displacements were seen in:

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Improving Access to Income – Success Story

„It is not easy to admit that you cannot afford notebooks and pencils to your children,“ Salwa Mohammed Hejab expresses. Salwa is a 30-year-old married woman from Ad Durayhimi District, Al Hudaydah Gov. She used to struggle to feed her four little children; yet, when she was registered into the Cash for Work (CFW) Program, her financial condition has improved. Before joining (CFW), life was very tough especially being an IDP, with 4 children. The thought of sending her chil- dren to school was a pipe dream that she nursed in secret as she is very passion- ate about education though she never got a chance to go to school.

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Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 15 October 2020

UNHCR and partners began cash distributions for 26,500 displaced families in the northern governorates of Yemen, with some 80 per cent of the families already receiving support. Families received a cash allocation to pay for rent and cover their basic needs, including food, clothing and medicine, to help them cope with the impact of COVID-19 on their livelihoods. Close to 100,000 IDP families received cash support this year, and cash support specialised to help IDP families prepare for winter will begin soon.

UNHCR finalised its regular protection assessment of some 68,100 families in September, including host communities and internally displace persons (IDP) returnees.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp5 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-686 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-686:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 687 entfällt! / Yemen War Mosaic 687 is omitted! oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films: